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200

XXII.

Panslavism

173

Editorial Note

Russian progressive and liberal ideologies are discussed by Mr. Elias Tartak in his chapter, "The Liberal Tradition in Russia," and by Mr. Vladimir Zenin in his chapter, "The Destinies of Russian Peasantry."

The reader is referred to these two articles, as well as to Mr. Max Nomad's on "Communism."

F. G.

XXII

PANSLAVISM

By

WACLAW LEDNICKI

1. The Slavophiles

186
329 IN CONNECTION WITH the Panslavistic trends which appear within the frames of modern Soviet foreign policy it seems justifiable to begin this study with the definition of Panslavism found in the works of Engels and Marx. This is the indeed striking formulation of the Panslavic doctrine, if this word may be applied, which Engels gives: "In the works of several Slavic dilettantes in the field of history there arose an absurd anti-historical current the aim of which was to subordinate the civilized West to the barbarian East, the city to the village, trade, industry and education to the primitive agriculture of Slavic serfs. But behind this comical theory there stood the terrible reality of the *Russian Empire*,—of that Empire which by every movement manifested a pretension to consider the whole of Europe the property of the Slavic tribe and, in particular, of its only energetic part—Russia. That Empire which, with two such capitals as Petersburg and Moscow, is unable to find its center of gravity until the *City of the Tsar* (Constantinople is called in Russian *Tsargrad*), in which every Russian peasant sees the true focus of his religion and nation, becomes the residence of the Russian emperor. . . . The intrigues by which Russian diplomacy supported the recently invented Pan-

PANSLAVISM

809

slavism are well-known in central Europe—a doctrine which could not better have corresponded to its aims.”¹

186*
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Engels and Marx, to whom I shall have occasion to refer later, fought against this doctrine, led by a clear knowledge of problems connected with international policy. And indeed the time of the Crimean War—the period when Marx wrote his brilliant articles devoted to the Eastern Question—was a time when the Panslavic conceptions became particularly timely. In the definition quoted above one finds the most important characteristics of the Panslavic doctrine. However, this definition does not exhaust the whole of it, and simply in order to be faithful to what we call an objective approach I should like, before showing the actuality of Engels' and Marx's opinions in the light of the Panslavistic trends of our days, to present the genealogy of this movement and some of its most important aspects.

186*
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Without going as far as Thucydides who, when speaking about the Slavs, whom he designated generally under the name of Scythians, said that “if these peoples ever unite under one chief and one idea, no power neither of Europe nor of Asia will be able to resist them,” one may say that, in general, the historians of Panslavism consider the Croatian Jury Križanić (1617-1683) the creator of this doctrine. Whether or not this genealogy is correct is a question in itself, but what remains doubtless is the fact that the Križanić episode has its special picturesqueness and flavor. Indeed that zealous Catholic, carried away by his Slavic sympathies, by the idea of the re-establishment of religious unity, and by admiration for the power of the Muscovite tsar, made his way from Italy via Poland to Moscow. There he tried in vain to organize the Muscovite tsardom against two foreign influences—Greek and German—and to incite Moscow to a struggle for the liberation of the Slavs from under a foreign yoke—a struggle which would unite the Slavic nations under the Muscovite scepter. The enthusiastic propaganda of the learned Croatian did not

¹ Quoted by Vasily Gippius: cf. F. E. Tyutchev, *Polnoe Sobranie Stikhotvoreniĭ*, Leningrad, 1939, pp. 10-11.

186* succeeded in convincing the suspicious Museovites — they felt a
 175 Latin and a Catholic in him, and in accordance with an already well-established tradition they deported him to Siberia. However, that poor Panslavic enthusiast somehow escaped from Siberia and reached the more comfortable Wilno, traveled farther in order to volunteer in the army of Jan Sobieski and to die for the defense of Austria in the Battle of Vienna under the Polish banners which he had vehemently insulted during his Muscovite sojourn.²

[648] Indeed, in the Križanić *Politica*, a work written in Siberia, it is possible to find several elements which some 200 years later were crystallized in the Slavophil and Panslavistic systems. As I suggested above, it would be possible to find some even earlier manifestations of Panslavic trends. But first of all we should indeed try to define at least in a general form the essence of this doctrine. I think that by and large Panslavism is a conception which embraces two main, divergent currents: one was connected with the movements of and hopes for regeneration and liberation among the oppressed Slavs; and as such this movement was directed against the two main oppressors of these nations — the Turks and the Germans. Since the Germanization of Bohemia and the disappearance of Poland from the map of Europe there has remained only one independent and powerful Slavic nation—Russia. Therefore one could see quite strong tendencies among Bulgarians, Serbs, some Croatians and Czechs, and a few Poles toward Russia as a possible liberator of the Slavs. On the other hand, among the same nations there developed at certain periods, especially in the nineteenth century, conceptions of a Federation of Slavs around Austria and without Russia.

The other expression of the Panslavic movement is the Russian one. The oppressed Slavic nations were looking for liberation, and their Panslavistic conceptions represented their hopes for freedom. Russia had, of course, a different approach to the

² Cf. P. N. Milyukov, *Očerki po Istorii Russkoi Kultury*, Paris, 1930, vol. 3, pp. 135-136.

PANSLAVISM

811

same problem—she was to become eventually *the* liberator, *the* protector, *the* unifier. For this reason these two expressions of the Panslavistic idea differ not only in their aims but also in their historical origins. 186^x 175

From the modern point of view—from the point of view of the political implications which the Panslavistic doctrine contains—the Russian aspect is, of course, much more important. Let us, therefore, devote our attention first of all to Russian Panslavism.

The direct ancestor of the Russian Panslavistic conceptions belonging to the second part of the nineteenth century is to be found in the famous school of the Muscovite Slavophiles and Messianists. The formation of this school resulted from different sources, and here again one finds interweaving ramifications of Slavic and Western European thought. 186^x 829 812

If one were to enumerate the different germs of ideas, programs, currents of thought, sometimes divergent and contradictory, which brought about the actual birth of the Slavophil idea in different Slavic countries, one would be obliged first of all to stress the fact that it took place in the nineteenth century and that it was in harmony with the political atmosphere of the rest of Europe. We find its ultimate sources in a variety of places. There was, for instance, the tenet of universal brotherhood which the Masonic Societies in particular had spread at the close of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries. To the same period belong the works of the German-Russian scholar August L. von Schloezer, the philosophies of Herder, Rousseau, and the Romantics. From the Christian standpoint a kind of Messianism came to the fore with the sentimental attachment of the Romantics to the Bible and with Bossuet's reliance upon the Hebrew prophets. Mention must also be made of the German philosophers Schelling, Fichte, and Hegel. Along with the conception of the unity of the Slav world which arose out of the studies of the European ethnographers and philologists, went the demand for the freedom of the oppressed nations—a demand proclaimed and strengthened by the French Revolution. The movement toward

186* a Slavophil philosophy was fostered by the propaganda of Czechs
 829 like Dobrovský, Kollár, and others who championed the claims of
 812 freedom for people of good will—propaganda based on affection
 for the national past and on Catholic conservatism which saw in the
 Slav world, and particularly in Orthodox Russia, a bulwark
 against Western Jacobinism. Finally there were many political
 factors to be taken into account: on one hand, the role of Russia
 in the Napoleonic Wars and the growing political power of Rus-
 sia, which was held to be the only power able to win freedom for
 the Slavic nations; and on the other, the anti-Russian tendencies
 voiced in the Polish risings, the leaders of which considered the
 enemy a nest of political reactionaries and a stronghold of vio-
 lence. All these elements, various and even contradictory though
 they were, contributed to the establishment of the Slavophil doc-
 trine and at the same time indicated the goal which it might ul-
 timately attain.³ As far as the purely Russian Slavophil and
 hence Panslavistic doctrine is concerned, some other factors must
 also be taken into consideration.

186* I must start *ab ovo*. For several very important historical rea-
 175 sons the Byzantine political influence in Moscow, in the Musco-
 vite ideology, became particularly potent. I have in mind the fall
 of Byzantium and some other events bound up with this great
 [648] catastrophe. In connection with the more and more imminent
 Turkish menace, in order to save Byzantium, in order to organize
 a coalition against the Turks, men in the Roman Church began
 to consider with even more urgency the already existing concept
 of a possible union of the two churches; and at the Council of
 Florence in 1439 the union of the churches was accomplished.
 The whole Greek world accepted this union. The representative
 of the Muscovite Church at the Council, the Metropolitan Isidor,
 also adhered to the union; but unfortunately his adherence did not
 conform to sentiments at home. And when he reached Moscow,
 after celebrating masses in Cracow, he was confronted by com-

³ This follows my articles, "Poland and the Slavophil Idea" published in the *Slavonic and East European Review*, London, 1928 29.

PANSLAVISM

813

plete disaster. He was imprisoned, and Moscow declined the union.

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Ever since that time Moscow considered herself as the new and unique center of pure orthodoxy, of pure Christianity. When in 1453 Byzantium was invaded, Moscow's prestige became even greater in her own mind. The Muscovite monks, working out a sort of Muscovite historiosophy and formulating the Muscovite political program, gave a very significant interpretation of that catastrophe: Byzantium had been punished by God for the sin of the Union of Florence. And then came the establishment of the theory of the "Third Rome": "Two Romes have fallen, but the third still remains." This third Rome was Moscow.

Thus was established a Muscovite eastern Messianism. This Messianism became more and more universalistic in its scope. The Muscovite tsars began to consider themselves the representatives not only of their own Orthodox world but of the whole Orthodox community in the world and, even more, of pure, unsoiled Christianity in general. Very soon after the fall of Byzantium and the spread of the Turkish invasion in the Balkans, many Serbian and Bulgarian émigrés, intellectuals of those times, arrived in Moscow with all sorts of Bulgarian and Serbian Messianic and imperialistic conceptions and theories, modeled on Byzantium and on Greek and Hebrew texts. Messianistic honey was collected from these Bulgarian-Serbian-Hebraic-Byzantine hives by various monks and old men like Philotheus. There were fantastic genealogies, orthographical mistakes — consciously or unconsciously committed—daring eschatological solutions of such problems as why the world did not come to an end on March 25, 1492, which escape it was supposed to owe to Moscow for not having acceded to the Florentine union. Greek prophetic legends, exploited by Bulgars as well as by Serbs, legends promising victory for the *rusy* (reddish) race, *xanthos genos*, became *russky* (Russian) race; and so, as Professor Milyukov stressed, "an orthographical mistake became a source of the Russian imperialistic dreams about Constantinople and the Straits." In a word, ortho-

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186* graphical errors and boundless imagination, fed on Byzantine and
 175 autocratic Imperial doctrines, decided for a long time the style
 668 of Russian political thought. Hence, practically, the Moscow
 795 Tsar and later the St. Petersburg Emperor became the head of the
 church of a Byzantine Caesaro-Papist type and assumed the position
 of a Byzantine theocrat. The conception of absolute power coming from God, absolute in the universalistic sense, meaning that the monarch was the ruler of all material goods as well as of human souls, became established in Russia particularly in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, after the period of the Mongolian yoke had excellently prepared the ground for such a conception of monarchical power. As the ultimate result of these events Moscow represented the type of an Oriental despotism with a tendency toward state control characteristic of these organizations (especially at the time of the *oprichnina* of Ivan the Terrible and later) and the equally characteristic tendency towards imperialism based on Byzantine religious and historical premises.

175 These bonds with Byzantium became particularly strong after,
 643 and in connection with, the marriage of Ivan III to Sophia Paleologus, the Byzantine princess in exile whom Ivan III received from Italy. This marriage is also an interesting story. Both Rome and Venice were still meditating a war against the Turks in order to liberate Byzantium. For the realization of this new, grandiose enterprise the help of the already developed might of Moscow appeared very desirable. Moscow had succeeded at that time through all sorts of belligerent activities and political manoeuvres in establishing its predominance among Russian princes and was on the eve of liberating Muscovy from the Tartar yoke. Led by western political conceptions, Rome and Venice thought that the good will of Ivan III could be bought by the offer of the title of king, and on the other hand by a marriage with a Byzantine princess who after the death of the legitimate heir to the Byzantine Empire would become vested with the right to the Byzantine throne.

PANSLAVISM

815

Ivan III was not very much interested in the European title of *king*, which did not mean very much to him. Moscow was so far away from the habits, manners, and international hierarchy of Europe that European distinctions and collaboration with Europe could not awake real interest in the exotic Muscovite state. On the other hand, Sophia Paleologus was considered by the Pope as a zealous Catholic; Ivan III needed a pure Orthodox fiancée. This last thing, however, was settled, and in 1472 Sophia Paleologus, the princess of Byzantium, the presumably zealous Catholic girl, became the Tsarina of Moscow and the most zealous of Orthodox ladies. The offers of the title of *king* interested Ivan, however, from one special point of view, from the very one which caused great discomfort in Cracow. Ivan III was supposed to become king or even emperor of the whole Russian nation (*in tota Ruthenica natione*). As I have said, Ivan III was not interested in the title, as he was not even very anxious to buy from the direct heir of the Byzantine throne the rights to the throne, and Andrew Paleologus had to sell them elsewhere. But the formula in *tota Ruthenica natione* awakened some interest, curiosity, and appetite in Moscow.

Ivan III had two reasons for being interested in this suggestion. The first one was connected with the fact that some of the lands which belonged to the Polish King and Grand Duke of Lithuania (in one person, as the King of Poland was at the same time the Grand Duke of Lithuania from the time of the union between Poland and Lithuania) represented ancient *votchinas*, appanages, of the Rurikoviches, that is, of the ancestors of Ivan III. Moscow viewed this circumstance as making possible the expansion of the Muscovite Tsardom, and it opened the door to Russian, Muscovite territorial pretensions and demands.

On the other hand the Ruthenians who populated these lands were descendants of people who had been Christianized from the eastern source; therefore, they were Orthodox. The Union of Florence included them, but not to Moscow's thinking. Therefore Moscow saw in them the object of a religious mission, and that

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175 was the beginning of the Muscovite tendency to establish a protection extending to a great part of the citizens of the Polish-Lithuanian-Ruthenian commonwealth, which meant an interference in the domestic affairs of the Polish state. This state of affairs led in Poland to the Union of Brześć (Brest) in the year 1596, the purpose of which was to assure the Ruthenian church of Poland an independence of Moscow, which had become especially menacing since 1589 when a patriarchate dependent on the tsar was established in Moscow. However the Act of Brest did not settle this problem, because of disagreements among the Ruthenians and mistakes of the Polish policy. (The marriage of Alexander of Poland and Lithuania with Helen, daughter of Ivan III—she was Orthodox—reinforced the Orthodox feelings among the Ruthenians).

175 Poland was powerful enough in the era of Ivan III to stop the inappropriate Roman schemes connected with the problem of unifying all the lands that could be called Ruthenian. And the court of Cracow received satisfactory excuses from Rome in the matter. But Moscow did not give up, and in spite of the fact that the daughter of Ivan III, Helen, was married to the Polish King and Lithuanian Grand Duke Alexander, of the Jagiellonian dynasty, Ivan III seized every occasion to insist on his views and his territorial ambitions. And we see that ever since then Moscow has constantly spoken of cities and towns situated inside of the Polish commonwealth, constantly augmenting the number of cities mentioned, adding to these formulations the sacramental phrase "and many other cities and towns." . . . It is justly said by Mi-lyukov that "on even the most cold-blooded reader of these dry ambassadorial reports, these heavy rhythmic strides of the Muscovite 'Stone Guest' may produce the impression of some crushing nightmare."⁴

But what were these lands—Kiev, Smolensk, Polock, Witebsk, "and many others," constantly demanded from the time of Ivan

⁴ *Ocherki po Istorii Russkoi Kultury*, Paris, 1930, v. 3, p. 48. Cf. for the story of the Union of Florence, of Ivan III and Rome, the brilliant work of P. Pierling, *La Russie et le Saint-Siège* (1896-1912).

PANSLAVISM

817

III until Russia could be led to the final partitions of Poland? It would be appropriate to stress here that the project of these partitions started even in the time of Ivan III. To the Emperor Maximilian, he made suggestions which later on, after the similar plans of Peter I, were finally realized by Catherine II, Frederick of Prussia, and Maria Theresa of Austria—and were later repeated by Stalin and Hitler. What are these lands? 175

At the time when the Tartars invaded Rus, when they were stopped in the west by the Poles at the Battle of Lignica, 1241, when later on the Muscovite principality was established and before the Polish-Lithuanian union, there arose, spread, and developed between Poland and Moscow, the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, an enormous empire organized by the dynamic, energetic and mighty Grand Dukes of Lithuania. Their ambitions and political horizons were equal to their military prowess. Very often they reached the gates of Moscow, menacing the city itself, and at any rate they had succeeded earlier in seizing from the Tartars all the Kievan Rus, with Kiev and all lands which now are known as White Ruthenia; so that Smolensk, Polock, Witebsk, Minsk, Mohilev, and the whole modern Ukraine found themselves within the borders of the Lithuanian-Ruthenian state.

In 1386 this whole enormous state was, after the Congress of Krewo in 1385, united to the Polish kingdom, and the Grand Duke Wladyslaw Jagiello, following Polish suggestions, married the Polish queen Jadwiga of Anjou. These lands obtained, after the Pact of Horodlo, 1413, and later after the Union of Lublin, 1569 (a sort of confirmation and development of the Pact of Horodlo), a complete equality of rights and privileges with those which were established in the Polish Republic. After the Union of Lublin, Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (including White Ruthenia and Ruthenia) had a common parliament. And each successive King of Poland had to be elected by the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as Grand Duke of Lithuania.

While Ivan III and later Basil, and finally Ivan IV (the Terrible) were trying to justify their territorial attempts on Poland,

175 centuries passed during which these lands were living in completely different political and social conditions. The regime of freedom, religious tolerance, and local autonomy became so strongly and solidly established in the Polish-Ruthenian-Lithuanian commonwealth that even Pskov and Novgorod, those peculiar republics accustomed to their freedom, menaced by the Muscovite despotism, made efforts to join the commonwealth. They paid very dearly for these desires; Ivan III and later Ivan IV uprooted these political dreams by the most terrific terroristic acts.⁵

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829 Returning now to the Muscovite Slavophiles, one thing must be stressed—that the first period of their activity was connected with more or less Russian historical problems. According to Herzen the moment of the precise formulation of the Muscovite Slavophil doctrine was the year 1836, when the famous *Philosophical Letter* of Chaadaev appeared. Of course it would be possible to find ties between the Muscovite Slavophiles and the Shishkovists of the beginning of the nineteenth century, but Chaadaev's Western doctrine, Catholic in its conception, became a kind of catalyzer which crystallized the Slavophil program.

However, it would be difficult to give a precise analysis of the Russian Slavophil doctrine without taking into consideration the so-called *ofitsial'naya narodnost'* (official nationality). This term was originated, I believe, by the famous historian of Russian literature Pypin and applied by him to the official Russian ideology elaborated at the beginning of the reign of Nicholas I by certain high dignitaries, among whom the most prominent was S. S. Uvarov, minister of education. His system was based on three principles: autocracy, orthodoxy, and nationality. Although it is possible that the first two elements of this system may raise no doubts, the third appears less clear. But for Uvarov and his followers it was not so. The concrete significance of the word "nationality" for Uvarov was "reduced," as justly stated by Pro-

⁵ Cf. W. Lednicki, *Life and Culture of Poland*, New York, 1944, p. 41.

PANSLAVISM •

819

feassor P. N. Sakulin⁶ "to the conservation of serfdom and of 186*
forms of life tied with it. Besides, Uvarov realized very well this 829
spiritual relationship between serfdom and absolutism, and he definitely expressed the view that autocracy and serfdom, having the same historical source, must have the same historical fate." When the Chaadaev scandal exploded, Count Benckendorff, head of the Russian police and the closest collaborator of Nicholas I, expressed the following opinion: "*Le passé de la Russie a été admirable; son présent est plus que magnifique; quant à son avenir il est au delà de tout ce que l'imagination la plus hardie se peut figurer.*"⁷

The establishment of this ideology was not confined merely to [656]
official interviews, proclamations, and manifestos. The government had in its hands powerful means with which to imprison the thought of the country within its official ideology. The most efficient weapon was censorship and interdiction of foreign travel. The aim was not only to impose respect for the "three whales" of that ideology but also to eliminate any disaggregating Western influence. I need not mention the fact that in the eyes of the representatives of the *ofitsial'naya narodnost'* the West was considered a source of all kinds of mischievous and dangerous ideas. Strong echos of slogans launched by the official ideology often 186*
resounded in the writings of people who from a certain point of 829
view might be considered independent. The most striking exam- 538
ple is to be found in the works of a man who, by the way, was one of the closest friends of the Russian Slavophiles—I have in mind Nicholas Gogol.

One remembers certainly Chichikov's troika "flying like a whirlwind" on the last pages of the first volume of *Dead Souls*, and one recalls perhaps that the writer compares that troika to a Russia "flying onwards like a spirited troika that nothing can overtake." "The road is smoking under thee," writes Gogol. "The bridges rumble, everything falls back and is left behind. . . .

⁶ *Intervyu Rossi v six Veka*, Izd. A. I. Granata, vol. II, p. 445.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 445.

186*
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538

What mysterious force is hidden in this troika, never seen before? . . . Russia, whither fliest thou? Answer! She gives no answer. The ringing of the bells melts into music. The air, torn to shreds, whirs and rushes like the wind, everything there is on earth is flying by, and the other states and nations, with looks askance, make way for her and draw aside." Is it possible to read this astonishing "lyrical digression" without being indeed profoundly amazed, especially when one remembers whom Gogol's troika is carrying—Chichikov, Selifan, and Petrushka? This is the Russia for which "other states and nations" must "make way" and "draw aside!" From this point of view Gogol's passage is very characteristic and representative not only as far as the official ideology is concerned, but also the Slavophil. One cannot without amazement see cultivated Muscovite Slavophiles like the brothers Aksakov, Khomyakov, Samarin, and many others absorbed in their idealization of the primitive Muscovite institutions and in their disdain for Western civilization.

The Russian philosopher, Vladimir Solov'ev, when criticizing this unjustified Russian messianism and pretension to obtain a privileged situation in the world, asked what benefits Russia might be able to secure to the world. Gogol, of course, had no doubts about this. His *Selected Passages from Correspondence with Friends* gives a very eloquent answer: only the Russian Church "like a chaste virgin has been preserved since the times of the Apostles" in her original immaculate purity, and this Church, "changing nothing in the state," might give power to Russia and become a leader of other nations because of the inefficiency of the Western Church. The tsar is the image of God on the earth; the organization of the Russian State awaits the same state of grace: "The more one scrutinizes the organization of the administration of the provinces, the more one is amazed by the wisdom of the founders: one feels that God himself was invisibly building with the hands of the monarchs."

It is true that some of Gogol's assertions were too strong even for Slavophiles, and his book awoke consternation not only among

PANSLAVISM

821

people like Belinsky but even among some of the Slavophiles. ^{186*}
 However, some of their own texts, which I shall quote later, and ⁸²⁹
 texts of writers close to them are not less eloquent. This, for in- ⁵³⁸
 stance, is the case with Nadezhdin.

We may find very similar items in a treatise written immediately after the scandal provoked by Chaadaev's famous *Philosophical Letter*. True enough, Nadezhdin wrote his treatise in order to rehabilitate himself after the unfortunate Chaadaev adventure; nevertheless the text remains striking. Here the author stresses particularly the power of Russian unity under the tsar's leadership, Russian health compared to Western disease, and the patience of the Russian people, which brought to their historical development a special character. "Who was the only one who thought and worked exclusively for us? The tsar! When did we write even one line in our history without the order of the tsar? . . . Our history must not be divided into periods of the life of the nation as Europeans divide their history, but into reigns which represent an unbroken stairway of beneficent activity of the tsars and religious humility of the nation. . . . Our spiritual life is not our achievement but the achievement of our wise and protective monarchs. . . . We have populated a space on which there would be room enough for ten and more Europes. Not in vain have we long been separated from the small corner called Europe. Our destiny is not to be the echo of the decrepit dying civilization whose death convulsions we witness, but to develop among ourselves a new, young, powerful, truly Russian civilization which will renew the old Europe." "The tsar is a father and Russians his children." "We are children, and childhood comprises our happiness. Our history has until now been a great poem in which there is only one hero, only one acting character. . . . Remember with religious humility and with noble pride that your existence is concentrated in your holy master. Without him you are only a line of zeros—with that monarchical 'one' these zeros make a billion."⁸

⁸ Lemke, *Nikolaevskie Zhandarmy*, quoted by Jan Kucharzewski, *Old Białego Czerwono*, vol. I, Warsaw, 1923, pp. 301-302.

186*
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538 What is particularly striking is the arrogance of this constant comparison of Muscovite Russia with not only Europeanized Russia, but the whole of Europe. The later Panslavists such as Tyutchev and Dostoevsky will continue to drive in a Gogolian troika. Gogol himself knew Europe and was, I think, very fond of it—especially of Italy. In his *Dead Souls* he showed even a kind of Ukrainian hatred for Muscovite life; yet in his lyrical digressions he sang his peans to the greatness of Russia. There is an element of duplicity and insincerity in this attitude. The same, as I have said, will appear in the case of Tyutchev, for instance, a highly cultivated and profoundly Westernized man. Similar will be the case of Dostoevsky. Both knew the Russian reality, and in spite of that both constantly sought to announce, proclaim, and greet the “coming” of Russia into Europe.

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829 Equally characteristic is another fact—that all these Russian nationalists fought with foreign weapons in their hands. This is a trait which appears continually in Russian nationalistic and imperialistic doctrines. Such was the case of the famous doctrine of “Moscow the Third Rome” and also of the Slavophiles and their successors the Panslavists. It is well known that all of them were students and pupils of German philosophy—of Schelling, Fichte, and Hegel. They readily accepted and applied to Russia the German teaching that in different periods of history the universal life reaches its culmination now in one nation, now in another. In their opinion the historical moment for Russia’s mission was about to arrive. The teachings of Schiller’s *German Greatness*, which may be considered a kind of preamble of Fichte’s speech to the German nation, could not but impress the Muscovite dreamers. Schiller explained that the greatness of the German nation is based only on its cultural and moral character. The German spirit is the only one for which “holy things exist.” This spirit alone communicates with the spirit of the universe, which has elected the German spirit to work at the imperishable task of culture. “The English look only for riches,” says Schiller, “the

PANSLAVISM

823

French are imbued only with their vain glory, the Germans were called to realize an integral humanity."⁹ 826*
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The dizzying speech of Fichte in which he launched the metaphysics of Germanism and the identity of Germanism and universalist messianism became, of course, a source of particularly appealing inspiration for the Slavophiles. But here again some reservations should be made. Fichte's speech, absurd as it was, was a reaction against Jena—the defeated nation was looking for an ideological compensation. The Slavophiles did not need any compensation, but they very quickly used the whole German armament of arguments in their fight against Western Europe and for holy Russia. German philosophical imperialism was directed primarily against the Roman nations. The Muscovite Slavophiles expanded that aggression and mobilized themselves against the whole of Europe. Very soon their slogans began to appear. Kireevsky in 1829 compared Europe to a dammed up river which transformed a fertile land into mud. Prince V. F. Odoevsky came to the conclusion characteristic for a Slavophile—that the West needed a Peter the Great who should "innoculate it with the powerful juices of the Slavic East."

The main arguments of the Slavophile program were as follows: the world is divided into two contrasting civilizations: the Eastern—Greek-Slavic, and the Western—Latin-Roman. The Western civilization is a product of the Catholic Church, of the traditions of ancient Rome, and of conquest—the Western states were based on the law of conquest. In the opinion of the Muscovite Slavophiles these three factors represent the three original sins of Western civilization. The Roman Catholic Church fell away from the Eastern Ecumenic Church, and since that time it lost its true faith. Rationalism which found its expression in Western Protestantism and atheism developed, the Church lost its universal freedom because of the papal supremacy, and conquest brought the struggle of the classes, political parties, and revolutions.

⁹ J. E. Spénié, *La pensée allemande de Luther à Nietzsche*, Paris, 1934, p. 85.

186* Quite different was the development of the Eastern civilization.
 829 Orthodoxy preserved the purity of Christian faith and teaching, which is established and confirmed by ecumenic councils. The Orthodox theology is the true Christian theology because it is based not on reason but on the revelation of the superior truth. The Russian state originated not by violence and conquest but by a voluntary invitation of the rulers by the people. Russia did not know feudalism, the Russian land never belonged to a feudal aristocracy but to the community, and the Russian people never knew inequality. The tsar was bound to the people by a union of love, and the *Veche* (Popular Assembly) expressed the will of the people. Providentialism and national exclusiveness were at the base of this doctrine.

[156] It would be impossible within the frames of this article to enter into all details of this system, but what was particularly characteristic in the teachings of Khomyakov and the Aksakovs was their conception of freedom which needed no guarantees. They considered treaties, contracts, agreements—in other words any legally established guarantee—evil. In their opinion the Russian people were repelled by juridical norms, and the Russian laws represented an inner truth. They did not care for any external usefulness or formalism. “All classes and groups of the population are penetrated by one spirit, by one faith, by the same opinions, by similar ideas, and by the same need or desire for common happiness.” (Constantine Aksakov). Another trait was the complete reduction of the role of the individual which appears in their conception of the Russian land community. The agricultural character of the Russian civilization brought the Russian people to an humble subordination, which, by the way, the Slavophiles praised enormously. That choral, primitive, and purely Christian character of the old Russian civilization was what they wanted to preserve. Connected with this was the argument of Russian simplicity. The same Constantine Aksakov stresses the fact that neither did Russian history have any theatrical episode nor did the Russian people like beautiful poses. “Nothing dis-

PANSLAVISM

825

tinguishing in that history," says Aksakov, no "beautiful effects," 186*
 "bright array," no role for the individual; and because of that, 829
 no pride and no memory for individual deeds. Every calamity is
 considered a punishment of God—every triumph an act of the
 grace of God. Thus "they do not erect monuments to their heroes,
 as there are none; but they build churches. . . ." "The history
 of the Russian people is the unique history in the whole world of
 a Christian nation which is Christian not only by religion but by
 its life—at least by the tendencies of its life."¹⁰

This was the idyllic picture of the Russian past as depicted by
 the Muscovite Slavophiles. They considered that Peter the Great
 had ruined that beautiful past and brought Russia onto false
 roads of historical development. They were false first because
 they betrayed Russian national tradition, and secondly because
 they brought Russia to the West, which was in a state of decadence.
 I need not enter into too many details connected with the famous
 legend about the "rotten West"—a few examples will suffice. One
 of the leading Slavophiles, Shevyrev, compared the West to a man
 spreading by his breath a terrible contagious disease. For Con-
 stantine Aksakov "West" meant violence, hatred, and enslave-
 ment; Russia—union, freedom, and peace. In his opinion even
 Russian paganism had been superior. This was why Russia, de-
 serving it, had obtained a better Christianity; the Russian pagans
 had a *chayanie* (hope, expectation) of Christianity. The Rus-
 sians accepted Christianization easily, without any struggle, like
 a child.

Now and then the Slavophiles failed to confine themselves to 186*
 Russia. They were looking for regeneration, for the restora- 829
 tion of that shining, luminous past, but they were generous enough 177
 to spread the benefits of this regeneration outside of Russia too. 18
 These benefits should be shared first of all by the blood relatives
 of Russia, the Slavic nations—and after them by the whole West-

¹⁰ S. A. Vengerov, *Ocherki po Istorii Russkoi Literatury*, St. Petersburg, 1907:
 chapter on "Peredovoi Boets Slavyanofilstva Konstantin Aksakov," especially pp.
 465-469, 470, etc.

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ern world. The Slavs, organized around the holy Orthodox faith and under the leadership of Russian autocracy, based on the strong foundations of the Russian land community, would become a powerful political organization strong enough to bring the Western world to the Russian pale.

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Here we are already in the center of the Russian Panslavistic doctrine. And this is, by the way, the picture of the whole Hegelian road of the Slavophil philosophy of history: thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Chicherin in his profoundly interesting memoirs, mocking the Slavophiles and especially Constantine Aksakov, says: "He (Aksakov) conceived Russian history according to all the rules of Hegel's logic; the old Russia represented the statement, the new—the negation, and the future announced by the Slavophiles was to be the restoration in a superior form of the original statement. This formula could be successfully applied perhaps only to the beard: the beard existed in old Russia, in the new it was shaved, in the future it would be restored."¹¹

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As long as the Slavophiles were busy with their national costumes, traditions, orthodox theology, and glorification of the Russian past, they might be considered more or less independent, distinguished, and inoffensive satellites or offshoots of the official national ideology—but satellites and offshoots who confined themselves to the worship of what they considered Russian national traditions. But when they extended their love to other people and their hatred embraced not only Peter the Great but the West, they became involved in political problems. And at this point some of them degenerated into Panslavism; besides, some new adherents, acting in the purely political field, joined the Slavophile group. Here again we must take into consideration certain other sources of influence and tradition—this time purely political.

Some of the political conceptions adopted by the Slavophiles appeared earlier—even at the time of Peter the Great and Elizabeth. From time to time conceptions of the liberation of the "Slavic brothers" emerged, but they developed especially strongly,

¹¹ *Vospominaniya B. N. Chicherina*, Moscow, 1926, p. 236.

PANSLAVISM

827

of course, at the time of Catherine II when Russia began the "liberation" of White Ruthenians and Ruthenians from the Poles through the partitions of Poland and finally "liberated" the Poles from themselves. At the time of Alexander I the same conceptions reappeared. V. N. Karazin, a well known liberal of the times of Alexander I, wrote in a memorandum: "Is it possible that the sovereign ruler of free Slavs, the unique protector of the Orthodox Church, can look indifferently upon the sorrow of nations close to them by blood and by religion?" "It is true," says Pypin through whom I quote Karazin, "that Karazin suggested cautious action in order not to offend Austria. But his dreams went very far: he dreamed of the establishment of a 'Slavic Empire' with one of the brothers of Alexander at its head: this empire was, with time, to be extended to the Adriatic Sea in Albania and Macedonia, and on the other side to embrace the southern 'Serbo-Croatian' lands of Austria. . . . This Empire, which would very soon develop and organize, would be bound to the Russian Empire by ties of religion, blood, and thankfulness, and would become Russia's 'storehouse' and natural base for all her activities and relations with Europe and Africa."

The same were the conceptions of other political writers of that time—Bronevsky and General Chichagov. (cf. Pypin, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-79). These conceptions were also discussed in Masonic lodges and even in several lodges of Slavic Unity which had been established in Kiev and in Petersburg. The Russo-Turkish War of 1828 again galvanized these feelings of Slavic solidarity, but this was the time when there began in Russia the great discussions between the Slavophiles and the Westerners—in other words, the time when the Slavophil doctrine started its period of crystallization.

I should like to stress the fact that we must have in mind several important historical dates around which the Panslavistic discussion became especially animated. These historical events and dates are: first of all, the Polish Insurrection of 1830-31, the Cracow Insurrection of 1846, the Slavic Congress in Prague in

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186* 1848, the Crimean War of 1854-56, the Polish Insurrection of
 175 1863, the Slavic Congress in Moscow in 1867, the time of the
 Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, the period preceding the World
 War of 1914-18 with the so-called Neoslavism and finally the re-
 cent movements organized by Russia in Moscow and in this coun-
 try among the American Slavic population and the Congress or-
 ganized recently, also by Russia, in Belgrade.

2. The Polish Problem

186* The first "set" of the Muscovite Slavophiles was composed of
 668 well-to-do people, people belonging to the Russian landed nobil-
 648 ity; they had estates with serfs, they had fine and rich apartments
 in Moscow. In the beginning they devoted their time either to dis-
 cussions on historical, theological, and literary problems in Mos-
 cow salons or to writings in which they expressed their views.
 And they also manifested these views in a special national type
 of domestic life; they wore peculiar hats and *kaftans*, which very
 often provoked sensations in the streets of Moscow; they ate Rus-
 sian meals and drank Russian vodka. All these details concern-
 ing their private lives and their naïve manifestations of Russian-
 ism are very pleasantly related in the memoirs of Herzen and Chi-
 cherin. At this stage of their development they were rather in-
 nocent and pacific, but they later became strongly intolerant and
 aggressive. Chicherin gives some episodes characteristic of this
 intolerance and aggressiveness. This appears particularly in con-
 nection with the great Slavic and European problem which the
 Muscovite Slavophiles, by the very fate of their doctrine, were the
 first to be called upon to solve. This problem was the Polish one.
 Slavic reciprocity, Slavic sympathy, harmony, regeneration, wars
 for the liberation of the oppressed Slavic nations—all these slo-
 gans, ideas, and initiatives could mean but very little in the face
 of the still bloody Polish nation under the Russian regime. How
 could other Slavs who were outside of Russia trust all the great
 promises given to them by the Russian Slavophiles and later Pan-

PANSLAVISM

829

slavists if these same Slavophiles and Panslavists had no solution 186*
 for the fate of a Slavic nation which was within Russia? As in 668
 our days, Poland was a test case, and without a just solution of 648
 the Polish problem there was no possibility of offering any more
 or less satisfactory solution for the Slavic problem in its entirety.
 And just here the whole system broke; and sympathy, justice, and
 harmony were replaced by pure violence. The usurping character
 of the whole doctrine and its demagogical essence became obvious
 in the light of precisely this problem. As a matter of fact, the 538
 Slavophiles had a precursor in this field—and a great one. This 668
 man was Pushkin. And unfortunately he may be considered ide- 648
 ologically responsible for the direction taken by Russian poli- 186*
 tical thought toward Russian-Polish relations. The intransigent
 and even ferocious attitude which Pushkin took at the time of the
 Polish Insurrection of 1830-31 predetermined the attitude of
 many generations of Russians toward Poland.¹² His anti-Polish
 and anti-European odes published immediately after the defeat
 of the Polish Insurrection could not but create an abyss between
 Russia and Europe. This historical event was especially tragic
 because of the fact that its creator was the most outstanding and
 captivating symbol of Russian Europeanism—a Russian who in-
 deed might be considered the Peter the Great of Russia in the
 field of her spiritual culture. Pushkin refused to see that
 Russia's annexations in Poland brought her geographically closer
 to Europe only at the cost of moral separation. In his odes he
 expressed not only a violent anti-Europeanism and an aggressive
 imperialism but also traced the lines for broad Panslavistic, Pan-
 russian conceptions. These vociferous odes, belligerent as they
 were, became a kind of poetical citadel, an arch of triumph under
 which passed one generation after another of Russian Russifiers
 and persecutors of Poland as well as all Russian Slavophiles and
 Panslavists. These odes became a canon, a national catechism,
 a kind of lasso thrown by the powerful hand of the great Russian

¹²I cannot enter into details of Pushkin's role in this case. I have devoted a special book to it.—*Cl. Pouchkine et la Pologne*, Paris, 1928.

186* poet over the heads of Russian politicians, writers, and poets.
 668 From this point of view it would be difficult to evaluate the enor-
 648 mity of the moral disaster achieved by Pushkin. And, as I men-
 538 tioned before, the fact that it was just the great European Rus-
 sian who assumed the responsibility for this makes it particularly
 painful. One has the right to say that had Pushkin taken a differ-
 ent attitude, the fate of Russian-Polish relations and therefore
 partly of Russian-European relations could have been different.
 It is possible, however, that my point of view is too idealistic and
 that I evaluate too highly the importance of poetical texts in the
 life of nations; nevertheless I am not at all certain that I am wrong.
 When examining the works of the Russian Slavophiles and Pan-
 slavists—the Aksakovs, Khomyakov, Samarin, Pogodin, Leont'ev,
 Katkov, Danilevsky, Dostoevsky, and even Vladimir Solov'ev
 (whose opinions were in many respects opposite to those of the
 Slavophiles and especially the Panславists), whose views are so
 actual for our own day, one sees how completely Pushkin's poems
 were in accord with the basic tendencies of Russian nationalistic
 historical and political thought, and particularly with its anti-
 Polish aspects. As a matter of fact, the sources of the historic,
 philosophic, and religious inspirations of the Slavophiles were quite
 different; Pushkin had nothing to tell the Slavophiles in this sphere.
 Yet it is sometimes difficult to resist the impression that they had
 him in mind and that his "anti-Polish trilogy" was a sort of poet-
 ical noose cast over Russian political thought, the coils of which
 bound even the most courageous and the most spirited.¹² It ap-
 peared that the Muscovite Slavophil system was unable to find
 any solution for the Russian-Polish problem which would harmon-
 186* ize with the general conception of Slavic unity. The Slavophil
 668 systems, both Russian and Polish (to which I shall come later),
 648 failed to produce anything positive and creative: the Russo-Polish
 829 antagonism in these systems could be dissipated only at the ex-
 pense of either Russia or Poland; there was no other alternative.
 This applies especially to the Russian side—to Aksakov, who in

¹² Cf. my article "Poland and the Slavophil Idea," as mentioned above.

PANSLAVISM

831

the presence of foreigners preferred not to speak of this "family quarrel," and to Pogodin, who, forgetting the ethnographic frontiers of Great Russia, attempted to enclose Poland within ethnographic and "democratic" lines. In Pogodin's opinion the latter boundaries were soon destined to disappear, since the only obstacle to an alliance with Russia lay in the Polish gentry, of "mixed Celtic and Latin origin," which should be destroyed by the Russian government with all possible speed. Aksakov used similar arguments in regard to the old Polish frontiers, while both Strakhov and Katkov attacked these frontiers even more vehemently.¹⁴ Samarin saw in "Latin and Catholic Poland" "not only a historical contradiction of Russia but of all the Slav world." According to him Poland, "having become a poisoned sword and an instrument of destruction in alien hands, has received the same poison into her own flesh and blood." Her only salvation lay in union with Russia, which should become "the historical representative of the Orthodox and Slavic element." This would, in Samarin's view, be the triumph of the one cultural view over the other, although he admitted the possibility of Poland's separation from Russia. Aksakov admitted this separation in the same way, prophesying that in such case Poland would be eaten by Germany. But even here we see the break of the Slavophil conception: the Slavophiles indeed did not know what to do with Poland. However, the most characteristic speculations were connected with the analysis of possibilities as to how a real union between Russia and Poland might be realized. The Slavophiles were sure that the only obstacle between Poland and Russia was the Polish Latinism and Catholicism—in other words the Polish Western civilization. They thought that this civilization did not penetrate to the masses and that only the Polish intelligentsia—the gentry—represented that civilization. Consistently enough, they advocated the liquidation of this class—a liquidation which would bring into the Russian pale the amorphous masses of the Polish peasantry. This was

¹⁴ The case of Strakhov, however, was less simple in this circumstance. Cf. my article "Russian Polish Cultural Relations," *New Europe*, New York, 1944.

186* the liberation and regeneration which the Muscovite Slavophiles
 668 were trying to secure to the enslaved Polish nation. The whole
 648 armament of their arguments and weapons may be found in the
 829 writings of Aksakov, Pogodin, Samarin, Leskov, Danilevsky, and
 Dostoevsky. In the light of the present Slav movements organized by Soviet Russia and in the light of the present extermination of the Polish intelligentsia under Russia's "liberating protection" one may see that the most audacious dreams of the Slavophiles and Panslavists of the nineteenth century are now being realized. The Russian autocracy was not able to use all means of extermination against the Polish spiritual culture because some of the elements of it were attached to a social regime which the Russian autocracy was bound to protect and preserve in Russia itself. From this point of view Stalin's hands are more free, and his policy of Russification might become more efficient in its destructiveness. However, even at the time of Alexander II and Alexander III, in accordance with the plans of the Muscovite Slavophiles and Panslavists the Russian government began certain reforms aiming at the gradual liquidation of the Polish landed gentry through the emancipation of the peasants and through measures favoring the latter at the expense of the former. These reforms would have been entirely justifiable if they had not followed the principle *divide et impera*. Russia was usurping the role of a liberator of the peasants, because the Polish revolutionary national government of 1863 proclaimed the emancipation of the peasants and promised them land without any compensation for the landlords. At this time the Slavophil school became indeed a political one.

And here something very important should be stressed: the Russian democratic and radical groupings were sympathetic to the Poles just because of the democratic character of this insurrection. Such was the attitude of the society *Zemlya i Volya* and of Herzen in his *Kolokol*. They were even trying to prevent the Russian soldiers and officers from fighting against Poles. Herzen at that time published eloquent articles in which he attacked the

PANSLAVISM

833

"patriotic syphilis" which was raging in Russia. The whole of 186*
 reactionary and nationalistic Russia launched its offensive pre- 668
 cisely at this point—the slogan was that the Polish Insurrection 648
 was not a national one and that presumably the Polish masses 829
 had nothing in common with it. This point of view became the
 leitmotif of all Katkov's writings, but very soon Aksakov's *Den'*
 (the organ of the Slavophiles) joined Katkov's *Moskovskiya Ve-*
domosti. The Slavophil phraseology followed that of the govern-
 ment, and Aksakov as well as Samarin explained the Russian-
 Polish War of 1863 as a war of Slavs against Latinism, as a war
 of Russia against the Polish landlords. We may see that history
 indeed repeats itself. The same slogans were used during this
 war when it was necessary to abolish the legitimate Polish govern-
 ment in London. Herzen understood this situation very well. On
 January 1, 1864 he wrote in his *Kolokol* as follows: "Having
 grasped here and there some vague ideas about the social mis-
 sion of Russia and about her lack of any solid aristocratic prin-
 ciple, our sweet dreamers preach that Russia represents some
 sort of democratic empire, some sort of kingdom of *equality* and
 masses, that *she* fights with Poland in the name of the freedom of
 the peasants against the landlords, etc. Do not be mistaken. . . ."18

Sumner in his excellent book *Russia and the Balkans* (Oxford, 186*
 1937) brings very correct comments to this development: "The 175
 Polish revolt of 1863 unleashed century-old hatred and fears. In 648
 the years which followed, the old 'Congress Poland' was merci-
 lessly dragooned within the framework of the administration com-
 mon to Russia proper while the 'Western Lands' Lithuania, White
 Russia, and the Western Ukraine were subjected to every measure
 of Russianism. Meanwhile a campaign was initiated of the
 same nature in the Baltic provinces and Bessarabia; and, to show
 without mistaking that Russian meant Great Russian alone, the
 Little Russian or Ukrainian cultural revival of that time was suc-
 cessfully attacked by Moscow, above all by the prohibition in
 1876 of the use of the Ukrainian 'dialect' for any academic or

¹⁸ *Istoriya Rossii v XIX Veka*, vol. 3, Z. Lenaky, "Polekov Vostanije," p. 22.

834

EUROPEAN IDEOLOGIES

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648 literary purposes. Symptomatically two of the men most actively associated with this denationalizing, Russianizing policy, were among the most prominent Slavophil or Panslav Muscovites of the day: Prince Cherkassky and Yuri Samarin, a close friend of Aksakov."¹⁸

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668 Cherkassky, Samarin, and N. A. Milyutin worked at the agrarian reform in Poland, and Cherkassky "distinguished" himself in the campaign for reuniting the Uniates with the Orthodox Church. "Samarin and Cherkassky are significant in the Panslav movement in that, unlike Aksakov or the earlier Slavophiles, and unlike the professorial type, represented by Lamansky, Miller, or Grot, they were active in administration and were well-known public figures. . . . Both men are also, above all, significant as representing the transformation of the idea of Panslavism into that of Panrusianism." (*op. cit.*, p. 67) Characteristically enough, Samarin was, besides all the traits mentioned by Sumner, a "considerable theologian," the collaborator of Khomyakov in this field.

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812 It is not mere chance that I mention this trait of Samarin's personality. The Slavophil doctrine was from its very beginning deeply rooted in religious thought. The father of the Muscovite school, Ivan Kireevsky, was first of all absorbed by problems of religious and moral categories. Parallel to the pre-Romantics, the Romantics, and the German idealistic philosophers, he was primarily interested in the spiritual structure of the human personality and in the problem of perfecting it. He was fighting for the unity and entirety of the human personality and believed that the superior truth cannot be conceived by rationalism but by the entire spiritual personality in which the factors of feeling and belief were more efficient than reason. M. Gershenzon, in his book, *Istoricheskie Zapiski* (Berlin, 1932), sensationnally enough stresses that Kireevsky committed a mistake which became the starting point for the whole Slavophil Doctrine. Milyukov pretends that the century-old Russian trends toward Constantinople and world domination also originated from a mistake—from an orthographic

¹⁸ R. H. Sumner, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

PANSLAVISM

835

mistake. I shall not try to discover whether or not Gershenzon was right. The point is that Kireevsky's example did not represent any exception. But what was the mistake? The mistake consisted in the fact that conceptions of the law of universal improvements based on a metaphysical truth led Kireevsky and all his followers to the belief that the Russian past, the Russian nation, and Russian Orthodoxy represented the incarnation of that law of universal improvement and of that metaphysical truth. These beliefs led them to their violent hatred for Peter the Great (the brother of Ivan Kireevsky, Peter Kireevsky, hated Peter the Great to such a degree that he was deeply ashamed of the fact that he himself bore the same name) and for Western Europe, and led them to the most simplified and crude philosophical interpretation of the historical development of Europe, which they based, by the way, again on European conceptions—on Guizot's triad: Roman heritage, Catholicism, and conquest. A one-sided rationalism characterized, in their opinion, modern Europe—to which they opposed Russia. 186*
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Exactly the same might be said about Samarin, who was, as I mentioned before, plunged in religious and theological speculations and whose philosophy was based on religious personalism and Providentialism. But what is striking is precisely this—that all these men, personally honest and dignified, busy with problems of individual self-perfection, demanding Christianization of international relations, immediately lost and forgot all these speculations as soon as they touched problems connected with concrete political facts. And the respect which they had for the nation, as such, was practically confined to the Russian nation alone, as without Orthodoxy the nation did not mean anything to them. On the other hand, no less characteristic of these self-perfectionists is the dissolution of the individual in their conceptions of the village community and of the choral principle—in the thesis of the Orthodox *sobornost'*. There is hidden their Achillean heel. We shall see later to what ultimate aberrations these doctrines led, for instance in the case of Leont'ev, who praised the "ignorance of the

836

EUROPEAN IDEOLOGIES

186* Russian people" as a guarantee against the dangers of European
812 rationalism.

3. Goldmann, Pogodin, Stur

186* The above mentioned remarks of Sumner about the role of
829 men like Samarin and Cherkassky illustrate the fact that although
in the beginning the Slavophiles were not always in *odore sancti-*
tatis in the official quarters in Petersburg, that situation changed;
the government appeared ready to use some of their conceptions.
However, similar arguments and weapons for the fight against
Poland—sometimes even sharpened ones—were offered to the
government from other sides also. We may find a fascinating
example of this in the Goldmann episode.

Charles Edward Goldmann, a German and a paid agent of the
Russian government, wrote two books: *Die Europäische Pen-*
tarchie, published in 1839 and *Europa's Cabinette und Allianzen*,
published in 1862, and several memoirs which he presented to the
Russian government. In his writings he tried to prove that the
original religion of the Poles was the eastern Greek religion, that
this religion had been uprooted by the Latin priests, that the oldest
Polish Christian cathedral in Gniezno had been transformed from
a Greek into a Catholic one. He attacked and derided the Polish
emigration: "Polish emigration?—Does not England hang it *en*
masse in Canada, while it dies from starvation in the hospitable
England and the French throw it as a prey to the Bedouins, to
the roulette, or to the *rouge et noir*? Russia knows very well that
England and France in their nobleness and magnanimity would
put the emigration next to the lackeys in their state carriage."

Goldmann also gives very valuable advice to the Russian gov-
ernment on how to eradicate the Polish spirit. First of all, Poland
must be cut from the West, and Polish scholarship must be sub-
merged in the Russian, the Latin traditions must be uprooted, and
above all the Napoleonic Codex which rules Poland must be liqui-
dated; the other Latin institution which must be destroyed is the

PANSLAVISM

837

Catholic church. Goldmann elaborated a very systematic plan for ^{186*}
 a consistent and gradual weakening of the Catholic church and ⁸²⁹
 its prestige in Poland. I have no space to enter into the striking
 details of that program which Kucharzewski revealed in his book;
 enough to say that it was indeed a diabolic program of system-
 atic spoliation of faith through, first of all, confusion of the minds
 of the faithful. His aim was not only the Catholic Church but
 also the Uniate Church. Poles, White Ruthenians, and Ukrain-^[795]
 ians were to become, as Russian subjects, members of the dominant
 church of the Russian state. In his cautiously elaborated strategy
 not a single weapon has been forgotten: the building of Orthodox
 churches, the substitution of Orthodox crosses in the countryside
 for the Catholic ones, the institution of the Greek calendar, the
 organization of a press of Orthodox propaganda for the people,
 the appointment of only Orthodox directors and inspectors in the
 schools, etc. The Catholic priesthood must be weakened by the
 favoring of sectarianism and material spoliation. "It is difficult,"
 he says, "to secularize one monastery; but the annihilation of
 194 monasteries and the refusal of any noviciates in order to create
 from the unused wealth larger funds for the clergy will find many
 advocates among the clergy themselves. In general, the state should
 not hinder but help the clergy to surely and freely ruin and prostitute
 itself."¹⁷

This was, in broad lines, the program for eradication of all
 Polish ties with the West. One is justified in asking if this system
 which was adopted by the Russian government in Poland was not very
 close to the main ideas of the Slavophiles and Pan-slavists as far as
 the problem of Russian-Polish relations is concerned. As was mentioned
 before, at the time when Cherkassky and Samarin were active in Poland
 Slavophilism degenerated into Pan-russianism. Parallel to this there
 developed, especially during the time of the Slavic Congress in
 Moscow in 1867, Pan-slavic conceptions of the Slavs united under
 Russian leadership. The most complete and consistently developed
 program for the sub-

¹⁷ Kucharzewski, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 281-297.

1 [Charles Edward Goldmann --- Analyst]

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829 jugation of Slavs to Russia was formulated in 1867 by the Slovak, Ludevít Štur, in his book *Slavdom and the World of the Future*. His book, which was republished in 1909 by such modern Russian scholars in Slavic as Lamansky, Grot and Florinsky, who, primarily because of their Slavophil and Panславist tendencies, considered Štur a "genius of his nation," represents indeed a quite exceptional tribute to the cultural, moral, and political forces of the Russian empire. Štur had, however, predecessors not only in the above mentioned Slavophiles but chiefly in the person of the famous Russian historian, politician, and journalist M. Pogodin, who himself represents a bridge between Slavophilism, Panrusianism, and Panславism. I shall not enter into an analysis of all the voluminous works of Pogodin; sufficient will be his memorandum written in 1838, in which we find items already known to us from Nadezhdin and Gogol and which will reappear in almost similar phrasing in Štur's apology of Russia.

Pogodin writes: "Russia! What a wonderful phenomenon on the world arena. . . . Russia is a population of sixty million people whom it was possible to count in addition to those of whom there is yet no account, a population which increases by a million every year and will soon reach a hundred million. . . . And let us add thirty millions of our brothers and first cousins, the Slavs scattered throughout all Europe from Constantinople to Venice and from Morea to the Baltic and the North Sea, the Slavs in whom flows the same blood as our own, who speak the same language and therefore, by the laws of nature are sympathetic with us, who in spite of geographic and political separation, form one moral unity with us, by origin and by language! Let us *subtract* this amount from neighboring Austria and Turkey, and later from the whole of Europe, and let us add it to ourselves. What will remain with them, and how much shall we represent? One's thought and breath are stopped! A ninth part of the entire inhabited earth, and almost a ninth part of mankind! Half of the equator, a quarter of a meridian! Russia is a state which includes all soils, all climates and is rich in all indispensable

PANSLAVISM

839

products. . . ." Further he enumerates gold and silver, which Europe no longer has, mountains, bread with which they will feed Europe, and forests with which they will rebuild Europe should it be destroyed; they will clothe Europe. He stresses the fact that because of the cheapness of labor and the moderate needs of the workers there is no other place where trade might develop so successfully as in Russia. But all these physical powers of Russia are nothing in comparison with her moral powers. These are common sense, daring, intelligence, patience, military virtues. All these powers form "one enormous machine, organized in the most simple and successful manner, ruled by the hand of one man, by the hand of the Russian tsar, who at any moment, by one gesture may put it in movement and give to it any direction and produce any speed." "I ask, is there anyone who would be able to compete with us and whom we would not be able to bring to obedience? Is not the political fate of Europe and therefore the fate of the world in our hands if only we desire to decide it?"¹⁸

The first part of Štur's books is a ferocious attack against Western Europe. He throws himself against Catholicism with Lutheran violence, against Protestantism with perhaps less ardor; he vehemently criticizes European political life, European aristocracy, European bourgeoisie, the spoliation of morals, luxury, demoralization, and economic structure and comes quickly to the Slavic village community, which in his eyes appears to be the magic secret of historical success, prosperity, and happiness. Another factor guaranteeing success and prosperity is a strong government, the lack of which seems to him to be the essential vice of Slavic states other than Russia. Russia represents a glorious exception: "Having taken away from the nobility all political rights, the Russian government by its autocracy rendered an immeasurable service in its time not only to Russia but to all Slavdom"¹⁹ I

¹⁸ A. N. Pypin, *Panslavism v Proshlom i Nastoyashchem*, 1878, "Knigoizdatelstvo Kolos," 1913, pp. 87-88.

¹⁹ *Slavyanstvo i Mir Budushchago*, L. Štur, St. Petersburg, 1909, p. 192.

186*
829 can not quote all his declamations spread over many pages about the *tsar batyushka* and the love of the Russian people for him.

After these statements he turns his attacks against Austria and destroys the conceptions of Austroslavism. He also demonstrates that Slavs, because of their geographical situation, their religious differentiation, cultural differences, and so on are unable to organize any federation. They are weak, they are simply fragments of one nation, and because of that "the concept of federative states has no sense."²⁰

The conclusion is obvious: "There remains a third road, the only one which is sure and has a future—the union of all Slavs with Russia."²¹ Then come all kinds of apologetic epithets, comparisons, in which Russia appears as a lighthouse in the dark night, assertions that the Slavs must not start their new life with the declining West but with rising Russia. "Russia . . . is the mother and the leader of all our national family." He is aware, however, of some difficulties as far as the attitude of other Slavs toward Russia is concerned. But he solves them easily according to his assertion that the only Slavs who hate Russia are Poles. By their whole civilization they are opposed to Russia. Poles did not want, as did the Russians, to subordinate themselves to one monarchical will. They did not know how to organize their life, and they had been defeated by Russia, to the great and lasting benefit of all of the Slavs. Had Poland resisted, Russia would have been far away from Europe and would not be able to help the Slavs; and of course the Poles never had any qualifications for leadership among the Slavs.

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517 With the Czechs the situation is less complicated: "In their present prosaic conditions they only weakly attract other Slavs. Although literature is diligently developed, in higher learning, in philosophy and history, nothing outstanding appears, with the exception of Palacký's *History of Bohemia*. And in arts and poetry the Czechs do not possess, with the exception of Mácha, a single

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 129.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 142.

PANSLAVISM

841

creative talent . . . material prosperity is the idol toward which ^{186*} the whole nation tends."²² The Czechs cannot remain in their se- ⁸²⁹clusion or create anything great—therefore they must join a greater ⁵¹⁷ entity. The so-called Illyrians and Catholic Croats—"flabby," "seduced by Austria," "coaxed by Czechs," will be "inspired by the Slavic idea as soon as they rightly understand it." Of course Serbia and Bulgaria will agree. The end of the book is a kind of glorious finale. He brings an enumeration of all the great battles in Russian history. He stresses the fact that the main power of Russia is in the union of the people with the tsar, that the learned people are work-loving and conscious of the greatness of Russia; that the army is deeply devoted to the tsar and to the fatherland; the clergy, "pious and zealous"; the people, "kind, strong and obedient."

Then comes the "Russian Geography"—"Russia represents nine ^{186*} Turkish empires, twenty-eight Scandinavias, twenty-nine Austrias, ⁸²⁹ thirty Germanies, and thirty-six Frances. The power of Russia is spread from the north-eastern corner of Asia, from Kamchatka, to the distant north of America, from the distant European North almost to the Carpathians, Danube, Black Sea, and farther to Ararat itself." Then follow figures concerning export and import, enumerations of Great Russian names, and so on. He concludes that everything works to the advantage of Russia—"Friend and enemy, war and peace, revolts and quietness;—Russia cast off the whole of Europe. She had the decisive voice at the Vienna Congress. . . . With one arm she embraces Asia, the second extends to America; inaccessible to Europe, she is a neighbor of the rotten Austria and the dead Turkish corps." Russia is the agglomeration of great and small things, of things divided and united; she is full of contradictions—Christianity, paganism, Islam, Byzantine churches, mosques, Catholic cathedrals. "She combines Europe with Asia, East with West, the dawn with the sunset, in other words, in the Russian kingdom the sun never sets."²³

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 146-150.²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 150-152.

186* The final conclusion is that the "immense Russian power pushes
829 ahead, it cannot be quieted, it constantly must look to new arenas
for its activity. The Slavic conscience strongly awakens in Rus-
sia . . . and it can not longer allow its relative tribes to remain in
perfdom and shame. . . . To make of the whole of Slavdom a base
is the only natural goal of Russian policy."²⁴

4. Danilevsky (1822-1885)

The most radical Russian formulation of the Panslavistic pro-
gram in its two directions—Constantinople and the Western Slavs
—unified by a violent anti-Europeanism, was given by N. Ya. Da-
nilevsky whose book *Russia and Europe* appeared in its first edition
in 1871 and in its second in 1888 with a preface by another Pan-
slavist, N. Strakhov. I cannot quote here the five hundred pages
of this book in which the most fantastic idealization of the Russian
past is married to the most vehement disdain and hatred for West-
ern Europe and finally organized into a cynical political theory
whose aim is to elaborate a system which would secure to Russia
186* a permanent political supremacy in the world. Danilevsky's starting
829 point is the denial of the conception of humanity and civilization
814 as a whole, to which he opposes a conception of struggle between
different cultural historical types based mainly on language group-
ings.

[177] This conception of cultural historical types deserves special
81 attention. Danilevsky combined the theme of Hegel, according to
which various nations appear in succession on the historical stage
as consecutive and ever more complete incarnations of the univer-
sal spirit, with the idea of the German historian Rückert about the
existence of separate cultural historical types. "For Danilevsky
such a cultural historical type is realized by every tribe or every
family of peoples characterized by a separate language or group
of languages sufficiently near to each other . . . if that tribe or
family of peoples is in general, by its spiritual disposition, capa-

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 158.

PANSLAVISM

843

ble of historical development and has already risen from infancy. 186*
 However, not all nations are equally capable of historical de- 829
 velopment. There are some whose destiny is to serve as ethno- 814
 graphical material to other stronger and more stabilized nations.
 Those others are God's whips whose mission is to smash from
 the face of the earth the outlived cultures and nations. Danilev-
 sky gives a series of historical cultural types: Egyptian, Chinese,
 Assyrian-Babylonian-Phoenician, Indian, Iranian, Hebrew,
 Greek, Roman, New Semitic, German-Roman or European, and
 finally Slavic with Russia at its head. Each of these types works
 out its own culture, and the principles of the civilization of one
 type are not transferred to another. Various types differ by the
 degree of versatility of their culture. Danilevsky sees four spheres
 of cultural-historical activity: the religious, the strictly cultural,
 the political, and the social-economic. No one of the listed cultural-
 historical types developed all of these four spheres of activity at
 once, with the exception of the Slavs and Russians, whose mis-
 sion will be to accomplish a complete 'four-principled' culture."²⁵

The road to that Russian predominance is a purely nationalistic 186*
 one; and, neglecting any declamation on Russian religiosity and 829
 other well known features of the Russian character as presented 668
 in the writings of the Slavophiles and abandoning all ideas about
 brotherhood and universal love, he brutally opens the door into
 the great future of Russia. Russia is destined for that future, but
 the road to it leads first of all to Constantinople and secondly to
 the emancipation of the Slavic nations. I shall not bring to the
 fore all his violent criticism applied to "rotten Europe." The
 Russian anti-Westernism here reached its climax. The book is
 supported by quasi-scientific arguments taken from anthropology,
 zoology, geology, geography, and the social sciences. It might be
 considered one of the most important scientific manifestos or ra-
 tionalistic Panslavic theories. However, the most important im-
 plications of the book are, of course, the political ones. "Being

²⁵ Danilevsky, *op cit.*, and article by V. Myakotin on Danilevsky in the *Entsiklopedicheski Slovar'*, T-A Granat, vol. 17, pp. 552-557.

186* foreign to the European world because of its internal structure,
 829 and in addition being too strong and powerful to occupy the place
 668 of one of the members of the European family, to be one of the
 great European powers, Russia cannot occupy a place worthy of
 herself and of Slavdom in history other than by becoming the
 chief figure of an independent political system of states and by
 being a counter balance to Europe in its entirety. These are the
 advantages: the utility and the significance of the Panslavic alli-
 ance in its relationship to Russia."²⁶ And this is another progra-
 matic assertion: "Sooner or later, whether we want it or not, the
 fight with Europe (or at least with the greater part of it) is in-
 evitable, and it will be a fight because of the eastern question, that
 is, for the freedom and independence of the Slavs, for the pos-
 session of Tsargrad—for everything which in the opinion of Eu-
 rope represents an object of illegitimate Russian ambition and
 which in the opinion of every Russian worthy of that name rep-
 represents the inevitable demand of Russia's historical mission."²⁷

186* Of course, on his road, Danilevsky fatally met Poland. His
 829 fight in this case was very simple. He liquidated Poland with the
 help of all kinds of historical accusations and political insinua-
 tions. In the same way he destroyed every spiritual cultural tie
 between Russia and Europe. His formula was not at all com-
 plicated, and one cannot really deny that this formula is the key
 to Stalin's present policy. When referring to the theory of poli-
 tical balance he says: "It is not at all difficult to be convinced that
 between Europe and Russia in this as well as in other respects there
 exists a direct and complete contradiction. It is precisely the
 balance of political forces in Europe that is harmful and even
 fatal for Russia; and the disturbance of this balance, from what
 ever side it may come, is advantageous and beneficent."²⁸

After several historical examples, Danilevsky gives the follow-
 ing formula: "At every disturbance of balance Europe is naturally

²⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 437.

²⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 474.

²⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 486.

PANSLAVISM

845

divided into two parties—one, the disturbant with those who *volens nolens* are on his side, and the victims of the disturbants who seek to restore the balance. Both parties naturally try to bring to their side the only one strong neighbor who is, by the nature of things (whatever, by the way, might be the forms, words, and appellations applied), outside of their family, outside their system. Therefore both parties flatter Russia. One seeks help from her for the conservation of the obtained predominance; the other one for liberation from the power, influence, and danger coming from the side of the disturbant. Russia may choose of her own will. On the contrary, during the existence of balance the political activity of Europe is directed outside, and its hostility against Russia is given free march: here, instead of two parties one after the other flattering Russia, Europe flows into one entity openly or secretly hostile to Russia. We must therefore abandon the thought of any solidarity with European interests, of any ties with one or the other political combination of European powers, and first of all acquire a complete freedom of action, complete possibility to unite with every European state, on only one condition—that such an alliance should be advantageous for us without any consideration as to what kind of political principle is represented at a given time by this or that state.⁷²⁸

It would not be arbitrary to assert that if for the contemporaries of Danilevsky his book was a "catechism" or codex of "Slavophilism" (words of N. N. Strakhov), for us it might be considered the bible of Stalin's present foreign policy. In the light of Russia's present play with England, America, and France, not to mention Germany and China, the guiding ideas of Danilevsky become particularly significant.

From the historical and moral point of view this book cannot resist any critique. Danilevsky followed the Slavophiles in their fanatic admiration for the Russia of the Muscovite period. Even from the point of view of Russian imperialism that Slavophil pre-

⁷²⁸ *Op. cit.*, pp. 488-89.

186*
829 dilection for the Ivans of Moscow and hatred for Peter the Great were not justifiable. As far as the territorial expansion of Russia is concerned, the Russia of the Petersburgian period did not acquire or "liberate" fewer nations and lands than the tsars of Moscow.³⁰

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538 Besides, for every unprejudiced historian one thing is quite clear—that the universal achievements of Russia in the field of spiritual culture were genuinely connected with her collaboration with Western Europe. The Russian national genius was silent or inarticulate for centuries, and only when the magic wand of the West touched the Russian soul did the voice of Avvakum become the melody of Pushkin's poetry. How can we imagine all the great accomplishments of Turgenev, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Tschai-kowsky, and Rimsky-Korsakov—in other words the Russian culture of the nineteenth century—without Europe and her inspiration? This point of view has been strongly stressed on many occasions by Russians themselves, first of all by Vladimir Solov'ev.

186*
829 From the moral point of view the ideology of Danilevsky is essentially immoral. Where messianistic arguments are adduced in support love changes quickly and easily into hatred. Danilevsky pays some official tribute to the slogans of "brotherhood" and "Slavic reciprocity" brought to the fore by the first Russian and non-Russian Slavophiles. But the essence of his doctrine is pure national selfishness. "Life and theory," says Solov'ev, "somehow very easily and unnoticeably replace the just and human formula of the national idea by the formula of violence and national murder. Not by any means do all the advocates of this idea directly preach subdual and destruction of foreign nations; but there exist roundabout means, softer in appearance although just as murderous in spirit. 'Our nation, by its historical march and by the natural succession of national culture, replaces all other nations who have passed away and are passing away.' This 'replacement' also is not without a cruel, bloody struggle and various national murders, but the final result is attained as if by itself. Such a

³⁰ This point, by the way, was stressed by Pypin and by Sumner.

PANSLAVISM

847

softened formula of national selfishness was taken from the Germans by our Slavophiles, who applied to Russia that which their teachers applied to Germanism; this view was systematically worked out among us by the author of *Russia and Europe*. Between him and the former Slavophiles there is, however, a difference which he himself points out although he does not always observe it. The latter affirm that the Russian nation has a universal historical calling, as the bearer of the final international enlightenment; Danilevsky, rejecting every international task, considers Russia and Slavdom only a special cultural-historic type,—however, the most perfect and complete (four-principled in his terminology), containing within itself the advantages of former types. Difference of opinion, therefore, appears only in abstract terms which do not change the essence of the matter. It must be noted, however, that the orthodox Slavophiles (Khomyakov, Kireevsky, the Aksakovs, Samarin), not rejecting universal history and admitting, although only in abstract principle, the solidarity of all mankind, were nearer than Danilevsky to the Christian idea and could affirm it without falling into obvious external contradiction.²¹ 186* 829

I think that there is nothing to be added to this essentially correct critique of Danilevsky's system. One must indeed recognize that from a certain point of view Danilevsky finds himself very far from the first generation of the Muscovite Slavophiles who were trying to marry their Russian nationalism and Slavophilism with universal humanitarianism. They had a mystic idea of the nation and a respect for it as for a person, a religious entity. (True enough only for the Russian nation.) Danilevsky lost all these things. There is no spiritualism, no idealism in his approach—just as in the case of another man, Constantine Leont'ev, who was very close to Danilevsky's conceptions and who might be considered the ultramontane of the whole school. Without any great enthusiasm or admiration for the Slavs, but simply guided by a fanatical fear of revolution, liberalism, and Europeanism, stress-

²¹ Solov'ev, *Works*, vol. v, pp. 25-26.

186* ing the fact that Byzantinism was the most definite historical type
 829 ("for the state it means autocracy, for religion—Orthodoxy, for the moral world—contempt for earthly things, repugnance for the dreams about the earthly happiness of people, humility") and that the "Byzantine spirit with its principles and influences, like the complicated tissues of the nervous system, penetrated the whole Russian social organism," he proclaimed that: "Russia should be frozen so that she may not decay," as every living process ends in death and decomposition—the state in which Western Europe now finds itself. Although there are no universalistic elements in the Russian past, the Russian civilization must be preserved as it is.

For Leont'ev all means are good as "politics are not ethics." He calls for courage, for people who will not fear the words "reaction" and "reactionary," who will understand "that nothing can be achieved without violence" and that in order to stop the "defrosting" of Russia "retrogressive reforms" are indispensable, first of all "the fight against public education because if Russia has succeeded in her resistance against the spirit of the times, she owes it to the ignorance of the Russian people."²²

5. Tyutchev (1803-1873)

186* Perhaps from the purely chronological point of view Tyutchev
 642 should have been discussed before Danilevsky. Indeed some of Danilevsky's most essential views were first brought to public opinion in 1869 in the review *Zarya*, in which he said that: "Europe not accidentally but in her very essence is hostile to us. Therefore only when she is in conflict with herself might she be safe for us."²³ In a letter to Aksakov on the second of October, 1867, Tyutchev said: "Civil war in the West is our best political ally."

²² K. Leont'ev, *Vostok, Rossiya i Slavyanstvo*, vol. I, vol. II, Moscow, 1885-1886; vol. I, p. 81; vol. II pp. 86, 109-120, 78-152, 180, 24-27; quoted by P. N. Mil'yakov (Miloshev), *Le mouvement intellectuel russe*, Paris, 1918, pp. 400-410.

²³ K. Pigarev, F. I. "Tyutchev i problemy vostochnoi politiki Rossii" in *Literaturnoe nasledstvo*, vol. 19-21, Moscow, 1935, p. 206.

PANSLAVISM

849

(cf. *ibid.*) However, as early as June 26, 1864, Tyutchev wrote ^{186*} to his sister: "I of course am not one of those who in their gloomy ⁶⁴⁸ patriotism would like to doom Russia to permanent solitude, isolate and seclude her forever. I admit agreements, but on the condition that they be only *accidental* and that, accepting them, they never forget the truth-dogma, that between Russia and the West there can be no alliance, neither for the sake of interest, nor for the sake of principles, that in the West there exists not a single interest, not a single tendency which would not conspire against Russia, especially against her future, and which would not try to harm us. And this is why the only *natural* policy of Russia toward the Western powers must be not an alliance with one or the other of these powers, but *disunion*, division of them, because, only when they are divided among themselves do they cease to be hostile to us—because of impotence and, of course, never because of conviction. This severe truth will perhaps shock the tender souls, but in the end this is the law of our existence as a tribe and as an empire, and the only way of ignoring this is to cease to be Russian."³⁴

The case of Tyutchev is perhaps the most fascinating. Belonging ^{186*} to a distinguished Russian family, a man with intimate ties with ⁵³⁸ the court, a diplomat, one of the most brilliant Russian poets, the poet of the *Last Love*, the poet of the metaphysic fear of "the cosmos" and the universal "chaos," the poet of nature, the poet who created new rhythms and melodies in Russian poetry, the Russian poet who translated Goethe, Byron, Schiller, Heine, Lamartine, and who himself wrote poems in French, a man who was plunged in religious indifference and scepticism, a pantheist, an "ashamed atheist" who was "entirely foreign in his domestic life not only to orthodox customs of the church, but alien to the traditions of the Russian church,"³⁵ (words of Aksakov), a man who had an arrogant disdain for the "gloomy grey Russian life," in which he saw only "offices and barracks, *chin* and *knut*," a man

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 205-206.

³⁵ A. Leshnev, *Das Poeta*, Coa. Ed., 1934, p. 22.

186*
538 who spent most of his time abroad courting Germans, French, Italians, establishing very friendly relations with Heine, Schelling, and other distinguished poets, writers, and intellectuals in Europe, married to two foreign women who did not know Russian, a cosmopolitan in his private life, "entertaining German barons, poets, and diplomats," always speaking French²⁸—Tyutchev became not only in his political treaties, articles, and diplomatic reports but also in his poetry the most violent advocate of Slavophil and Panславistic ideas and of Russian anti-Europeanism.

186*
649 There were, of course, slight distinctions between him and the Muscovite Slavophiles. The kind of patriarchal democratism which characterized them, their adulation of the Russian peasant, their theory about the Russian village community—for all these things Tyutchev cared very little. His primary interests were connected with foreign affairs. He was the "minister of foreign affairs" of the Slavophiles. Therefore the Slavic problem was always important to him. He wrote and published many political poems addressed to the Slavs and to the Czechs and poems connected with the Polish problem,—but again in a very peculiar way. When Murav'ev the "hangman" plunged the Polish Insurrection of 1863 into massacres and blood, Tyutchev addressed to him a homage of greatest thankfulness and admiration. And when the grandson of Suvorov, the famous hero of the Prague massacre in Warsaw in 1794, appeared decent enough to refuse participation in a collective address to Murav'ev, Tyutchev launched a mischievous and sarcastic epigram in which he made fun of Suvorov's misplaced humanitarianism. Besides, he, in 1866 wrote a poem glorifying Murav'ev's memory. True enough that in 1831 his attitude had been a little different. He wrote at that time a poem by which Poles have very often been lulled and which was usually quoted as a Russian pro-Polish text. First of all there is, I think, a kind of moral insanity in bringing the name of Tyutchev as a symbol of Russian-Polish fraternity; the name of the poet who in the most cynical way sang the glory of Murav'ev! Besides, even

²⁸ Lednicki, *ibid.*, p. 30.

PANSLAVISM

851

the poem of 1831 gives a rather peculiar consolation to the Poles 186*
—this is what Tyutchev says to them: "Believe the word of the 649
Russian nation: we shall sacredly preserve your ashes, and our
common freedom as a Phoenix will find its birth in them."

In the recent works devoted to Tyutchev such as those of Pigarev, Gippius, Stremoukhov, Lezhnev, one important detail has been revealed. Both the Slavophiles and Tyutchev representing the landed Russian nobility, were deeply impressed by the revolutionary movements in Europe. Tyutchev in his anti-revolutionism, became a kind of Russian Joseph de Maistre and he very soon came to the conception that in Europe there existed two powers: Revolution and Russia. He developed this conception in his articles and poems and for many years he was busy with the organization of Russian propaganda in Europe for the spreading of his political ideas.

One of his¹ most significant poems in this respect was, the poem 186*
The Sea and the Rock, in which he gives a picture of how the 829
gigantic foot of the rock will appease the stormy waves of the 538
sea. The idea which was symbolically presented in this poem
was developed in a political language in his article *Russia and
Revolution* written in 1848.³⁷ His conception of the greatness
of Russia developed as a function of the mission which he attributed to Russia; and here his imagination becomes boundless. In his famous poem *Russian Geography* he mentions Moscow, Petersburg, and Constantinople as the capitals of the Russian empire, in which he sees "seven interior seas and seven great rivers from the Nile to the Neva, from the Elbe to China, from the Volga to the Euphrates, from the Ganges to the Danube—this is the Russian empire."

This was written by a poet who, although he revealed in his lyrical poetry his tenderness for the "original charm" of the "poor villages," "humble nakedness," "boring nature," of the "land of everlasting patience," did not himself care at all for the Russian landscape. This is what he wrote in a letter to his wife:

³⁷ Pigarev, *op. cit.*, *Literaturnoe Nasledstvo*, pp. 195-196.

1 [Tyutchev's --- Analyst]

186* "An immense plain—the Scythian plain which you didn't like on
829 my relief map, where it spreads out like an enormous spot, is
538 not more pleasant in reality."²⁸

186* Not less striking than his ¹*Russian Geography* are his his-
829 torical views and the formulation of the Russian mission which
814 we find in his two French articles *Russia and Revolution* and
Rome and the Roman Question, and in a large work which he
was preparing — *Russia and the West*. In all these writings
he draws an apocalyptic picture of the destruction of the Europe
of Charlemagne, of the Europe of the Treaties of 1815, of the
destruction of the Papacy, Catholicism, and Protestantism. He de-
mands a definitive formation of a great Orthodox empire, "the
legitimate empire of the East, which will be realized by the ab-
sorption of Austria by Russia and the 'return' (*sic!*) of Constan-
tinople to Russia and by the union of the two churches." The con-
clusion of these events will be symbolized by the Russian tsar as
the Orthodox emperor in Constantinople, as the master and pro-
tector of Italy and Rome, and by an Orthodox pope in Rome as a
subject of the emperor.²⁹ In his article *Papacy and the Roman
Question* he constantly attacks all kinds of "usurpatory" tenden-
cies of Western thought and seems completely unaware of the
fact that his own conception represents the most fantastic histor-
ical usurpation—although not at all unreal in the light of our
days. This is the way in which he ends his article: "Permit me
to recall in conclusion, an incident connected with the visit which
the Emperor of Russia made to Rome in 1846. One may still re-
member perhaps the general emotion with which the Emperor
was received upon his appearance in the Church of St. Peter,—
this was the appearance of the Orthodox Emperor who returned to
Rome after several centuries of absence—and the electric flash
which went through the crowd when it saw him going to pray at
the tombs of the apostles. This emotion was legitimate. The pros-
trated Emperor was not alone; all Russia was prostrated with him.

²⁸ Lezhnev, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

²⁹ Figarov, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

~[Tyutchev -- Analyst]

PANSLAVISM

853

Let us hope that he did not pray in vain before the holy relics!"⁴⁰ 186*
 The *Revue des Deux Mondes* published this article and prefaced 829
 it with a small and rather melancholic note: "Charlemagne is no 814
 longer in Paris or in Aix-la-Chapelle, he is in Moscow or in St.
 Petersburg. And one must above all keep in mind the fact that the
 new Charlemagne coming to Rome clearly pretends to bring, as
 the former one, a great material power, but he has no intention
 of coming there to find a spiritual, a moral consecration of his
 power. Far from that; it is he who, so to say, comes to consecrate
 the papacy. . . ." "One might make many other reflections upon
 this subject, and give some peculiar details on the march of ideas
 in one part of Russian society, and show how the school which
 formerly had Monsieur de Maistre as its chief and which made its
 gospel from the doctrines of *Du Pape* arrived gradually, by a kind
 of national logic, to find that the real pope was the tsar."⁴¹

But what is especially striking here is that Tyutchev appeared 186*
 able to marry in his thought and in his heart this conception of a 829
 Russian Charlemagne in Constantinople and Rome with his own
 formula of Russia, a land of "officers, barracks, chin and knut."
 Justly asks Lezhnev: "In the name of what is the 'humble Russia'
 to obtain 'the thunder of earth and sword of heaven?' . . ." "Tsar-
 ist Russia spreads like an enormous spot over the map of the
 world—this is Tyutchev's 'Russian geography'. . . . What is Rus-
 sia promising to those innumerable nations which she intends to
 subdue? Nothing but the quietness of the cemetery or of a north-
 ern desert."⁴² Indeed this whole transformation of "barracks"
 into St. Sophia and St. Peter is a terrible fairy tale and on this
 occasion Lezhnev says that the theocratic tiara suits Nicholas I
 as "a saddle a cow."⁴³ As we know there are some other candi-
 dates for the same saddle. In his poems launched against the
 Vatican Tyutchev attacks the Pope because of his "fatal word":
 "the freedom of conscience is delirium." And this was written by

⁴⁰ *Revue des Deux Mondes*, January 1, 1850, p. 133.

⁴¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 118.

⁴² A. Lezhnev, *Two Poets* . . . Gos. Izd., 1934, pp. 13-14.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

186^{*} a Russian of the time of Nicholas! Certainly the most deceiving
 329 trait in the whole Tyutchev episode is his hypocrisy—that play
 of his with love and hatred. Repulsive indeed is this Tartuffe who
 so much resembles Saltykov's Yudushka Golovlev, constantly
 spreading around him his ointment of sacred hatred. The starting
 point of all his conceptions, as I showed before, was his fear of
 European revolution. This also explains in part his attitude to-
 ward the Polish insurrections and toward the Hungarian Insurrec-
 tion of 1848. Russia had to be strong in order to be able to save
 the world from the catastrophe. We see here the presence of his
 former altruistic conceptions—Europe is in a state of ideological
 disaster, the world is in danger—the “Russian rock” of legitim-
 ism will save it! However, this was not quite so. Russia's tragic
 days during the Crimean campaign brought our political Tartuffe
 to some different views. He consoled himself by the following
 significant consideration: “In this ultimate fight we should perish
 if the West were one, but it is two: the red one and the one which
 must be absorbed by it. We have been opposing it for forty years,
 and now here we are on the border of the precipice. And now
 the red one in its turn will save us.”⁴⁴ This is the best revelation
 of Tyutchev's universal historiosophic conceptions.

Merezhkovsky once justly observed that “one” of the traits of
 Russian Slavophilism was its “softbodiedness,” bonelessness and
 inability, lack of desire to carry its thought to the end. And Tyut-
 chev “puts bones into the body and dots the i's; his logic is merci-
 less.” . . . “Tyutchev is clever, and his politics are not stupid; but
 as far as his conscience is concerned it enters least of all with his
 politics.”⁴⁵ Not only hypocrisy but really a complete lack of
 human loyalty characterized him. During the whole of the life
 of Nicholas I this “bishop of Russian imperialism” did nothing
 but spread incense around Nicholas. But as soon as the latter
 died, after the Crimean War, Tyutchev shouted: “Thou wert not

⁴⁴ Pigarev, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

⁴⁵ Lezhnev, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

PANSLAVISM

855

a tsar but an actor" and expressed his indignation about "the monstrous stupidity of this ill-fated man." 186*
829

This was one missionary of holy Russia, a prophet who appeared before the world with "a crucifix and a dagger" in his hands. Let us now meet one who for the triumph of his Russian truth was ready to change his crucifix into a dagger.

6. Dostoevsky (1821-1881)

Without entering into a detailed description of Dostoevsky's well-known messianic conceptions about the "God-bearing nation" and all his speculations about Russia and Europe, which he develops in his novels and short stories as well as in his *Diary of a Writer*, I shall confine myself to his general philosophy of history. The first thing I should like to stress is that the book of Dostoevsky is a book almost as much about Europe as about Russia—if not even more about Europe. His "Russian boys" are constantly busy with the Russian God—but even more with the Catholic God—with the Inquisition, with socialism, European rationalism, atheism, revolutionism, and so on. And this is so in spite of the fact that in his novels we remain in Russia, constantly in Russian monasteries, taverns, St. Petersburg apartments or streets, or in some provincial Russian towns. Another thing which should be remembered is that Dostoevsky from his very childhood and youth was a pupil first of all of European literature. If one should try to discover in the texts of Dostoevsky any proof of genuine and real sympathy for that European civilization which formed his art and thought, one would undoubtedly be unsuccessful. He very often declaims his enthusiastic love for Europe, but that love is addressed only to the "holy stones" of the "European cemetery." On the other hand the types of Europeans who appear in his novels—French, Italians, Poles—as well as the pictures of Europe taken either from the gambling casinos, London streets, French railways, or Parisian department stores, are deeply repulsive—with some few exceptions: Mr. Astlee in *The Gambler* and

186*
538
829

856

EUROPEAN IDEOLOGIES

- 186* Dostoevsky's feeling for Germany, especially for Bismarck.
- 538 This obvious antipathy, if not hatred, appeared in Dostoevsky
- 829 after his Siberian exile. One would be willing to explain this by the negative impression which Europe made upon Dostoevsky when he visited it. However, I think that the motives of his feelings were of a different nature. Dostoevsky was sent to Siberia
- 186* because of his European infatuations. We know how deeply he
- 829 suffered during his exile and indeed how unpleasantly he denied his former opinions and appeared ready to embrace less dangerous and less politically compromising roads of thought, although in his situation it was difficult to be heroic to the end. Dostoevsky suffered because of Europe, and I think that this personal motive has to be taken into consideration. It would be useless here to quote all Dostoevsky's astonishing and fantastic conceptions of what he thought to be the real historical relationship between Russia and Europe. We know that Dostoevsky was always ready to say that "to be a real Russian means to be a real European," and that some of his heroes felt when abroad that they were the unique Europeans among Europeans, that French were French, English English, Germans German, but only Russians besides being Russians were also Europeans, and have I to recall his really incredible and almost absurd speculations about the "Russian seekers"—Onegin and Aleko—in his Pushkin speech? Only an aberration of mind could bring one to assert that Onegin killed his friend and Aleko his wife perhaps because of their longing for universalistic ideals. Dostoevsky's deep belief was that only the Russian thought was able to embrace universalistic goals. By these trends of his beliefs he certainly closely approached the Slavophiles and later the Russian *narodniki* as well as the Pan Slavists; and in his political articles he very often waved the banners of Slavic brotherhood, of a Pan Slav union under Russian leadership. And one easily remembers his piercing and hysterical shouts: "Constantinople must be ours!" But not all these slogans which, after all, in Dostoevsky's time had become trivial clichés, should interest us here. More significant, as I mentioned before, is Dostoev-

PANSLAVISM

857

sky's general philosophy of history, and this has been brilliantly studied and presented by L. Grossman in his study *Dostoevsky and Europe*. Dostoevsky likes to hide the horrible truth about man and mankind with the help of a Russian ikon which miraculously allows him to escape from responsibility. His heroes very often act in the same way, and Dostoevsky usually insinuates that their monstrous moral degradations are due to Western European influences. He constantly uses the method of substitution, attaching European labels to the most ferocious manifestations of his own thought. He very freely uses the author's privilege of disclaiming responsibility for the opinions of his heroes. Shestov, however, seized Dostoevsky in his elusive jumps of thought and brought him to trial. As far as the purely political historiosophic conceptions of Dostoevsky are concerned, Grossman did the same. These are the general conclusions which the "complex philosophy of Dostoevsky" implies: "The mission of the Slavs is to decide and finish the thousand-year old internal conflict of the Roman-German world to the advantage of the Germans and to the mutual domination of the Slavs and the Germans in Europe."⁴⁸ Ancient Rome was the source of European civilization; gradually losing its pagan character the Roman idea of universal monarchy was transformed into the European ideal of universal union in Christ. With centuries this great historical conception split—in the East appeared the Slavic idea of union based on the gospel, in the West—the Roman Catholic idea of a universal monarchy with the Pope at its head. The Papacy yielded to the third temptation of the devil and "sold Christ for earthly domination." The next phase of the development of the Catholic idea, and this means the next deformation of Christian ideals, is to be found in France which created Socialism. In this period the definite triumph of materialism over spiritualism was achieved.

To this extreme historical formulation of Western conceptions was opposed the German idea which, from the time of Arminius

⁴⁸ L. Grossman, *Tvorchestvo Dostoevskogo*, Moscow, 1928, p. 198. All of Dostoevsky's political system is to be found in the *Diary of a Writer* and in novels like *The Possessed* and in his letters. I follow Grossman for lack of space.

186^x to Bismarck, represented only a negative idea of protest against
 829 Rome. This negative "idealism" was the main source of national German inspiration. But at the moment of the final German victory Germany, lacking its object, will be also lacking inspiration, and this will bring her to spiritual death. The final course of this worldly struggle will take on an apocalyptic character. The Pope, having lost his allies in the persons of emperors and kings, will throw himself into the arms of the proletariat, trying to become a socialistic vicar of St. Peter. Against this will rise Germany for the ultimate battle. But the last word will be said by the united East. In alliance with Germany, Russia will destroy the "two-headed monster" of Catholicism and Socialism, and then will be established the domination of the Germans, now inspired by Russia, in the West, and the domination of Russia in the East.⁴⁷ As I mentioned before (and Grossman brings many proofs of this), Dostoevsky had a great admiration for Bismarck, the "iron chancellor." He hoped that the creator of the formula of "union in blood and iron" would split Europe with his powerful sword, and that "after rivers of blood and hundreds of millions of heads" the world would accept the new word of the Slavic gospel. And this was to be what Dostoevsky called "The free Pan-Slavic union of Europe."⁴⁸ The Franco-Prussian war became a source of inspiration for his conception. "Just like the most aggressive German professors he calls for a march against France" and "wants to enlighten Europe by the light of the gospel, by Bismarck's formula, and by the direct help of the German armies." France will be broken by "blood and iron," "Tsargrad" will be in the hands of Russia, England and France will be defeated by the Russian-German armies, and so the triumph of Russian Christianity will be achieved.⁴⁹ In other words he follows the reasonings of his Raskolnikov: "*vive la guerre éternelle*—till the new Jerusalem."

⁴⁷ Grossman, *op. cit.*, pp. 199-203.

⁴⁸ Grossman, *op. cit.*, pp. 207-208.

⁴⁹ Grossman, *op. cit.*

PANSLAVISM

859

It is true enough that in the very last period of his life as if having lost his hopes for Russia to achieve that universal mission he suddenly called: "To Asia! To Asia!" "To that great mother of all religions, to the original 'neighborhood of God,' to the sacred nearness of the thousand-year-old contemplators of heavenly revelations—to India and Palestine. . . ."⁵⁰ 186* 829

7. Bakunin (1814-1876)

There is a literary theory that Dostoevsky's "possessed" Stavrogin is a fictionalized portrait of Bakunin. The author of this hypothesis, L. Grossman, accumulated extremely interesting proofs for his discovery. I shall not enter into an analysis of this theory, but it is quite true that the moral labyrinths of Bakunin's life and political revolutionary career lend themselves very well to this comparison. Bakunin's biographers made great efforts to explain and justify by political Machiavellianism Bakunin's rampant attitude towards Nicholas I and Alexander II, and his behavior in Siberia, which was morally paradoxical to say the least. Therefore, there is no doubt that the ideological prestige of Bakunin's political activities as well as of his writings is strongly contaminated by his very doubtful personality. His *Confession* and his letter to Alexander II surpassed the repentance of the Decembrists, the agony of Chaadaev, and the yielding of Dostoevsky. His infatuation for Murav'ev-Amursky and the role he played in the Irkutsk society are not less astonishing. However, he has his place and an important one in the development of Slavophil and Panславistic ideas. Bakunin represents a kind of revolutionary Panславism, but in this field of his political conceptions one may find the same inconsistency that characterized his moral attitude. 186*

National and Slav feelings as well as feelings of sympathy for Poland had been awakened in him by Lelewel, famous Polish historian and geographer, radical democrat and member of the Revolutionary Government of 1830-31, during their meeting in Brus- 186* 829 648

⁵⁰ Grossman, p. 213.

360

EUROPEAN IDEOLOGIES

186* sels. Lelewel "told him about the primitive democratic Polish
 829 municipality, about the agrarian Slavic collectivity, about brotherly
 648 institutions and customs distorted later by the class structure and the enslavement of people which came from the West. At that time he conceived a new goal for himself which was "a Russian revolution and a republican federation of all Slavic lands, and the establishment of one indivisible Slavic republic, federative only as regards administration, and politically centralized."⁵¹ At that time, under the influence of western European populism and socialism on one side and, on the other, of his intimate contacts with the Polish emigration in Paris, Bakunin started to crystallize his own Russian populist and revolutionary ideas. The first manifestation of these crystallized ideas took place in Paris in 1847 when he delivered his famous Polish speech at the commemoration of the Polish Insurrection of 1830-31. In this speech he attacked Nicholas I, he asserted that the Russian and Polish nations must be reconciled, that both were paying for the discord introduced by Russian autocracy, and that the Russian revolution would bring freedom to both nations. He said that this task could be realized only through the Russian-Polish alliance; without the liberation of Poland, Russian freedom could not be born. And finally he called for the liberation of all Slavic nations in order to bring about the final collapse of despotism in Europe.

186* A little more complicated was the atmosphere of the Slavic
 668 Congress in Prague, in which he took part and delivered several
 [575] speeches. At that Congress, as we know, Palacký advocated the idea of a Slavic federation with Austria in which the Czechs would play the dominant role. This idea was not popular among other Slavs, and the atmosphere of the Congress was not at all encouraging.

Bakunin first of all stressed the fact that Russia, by enslaving Poland and especially by giving a part of her to the Germans—the main enemies of the Slavic race—tore herself away from Slav-

⁵¹ J. Kucharszewski, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 161-162; cf. also V. Polonsky, *M. A. Bakunin*, vol. I, Coa. Ind., 1925, pp. 155-156.

PANSLAVISM

861

dom. She could return to Slavdom only by the liberation of 186^{*}
 Poland. In this point Bakunin was certainly much more consist- 668
 tent than the Muscovite Slavophiles ever were. On the other hand,
 he tried to warn the Congress against narrow nationalism, against
 hopes attached to the Austrian dynasty as well as against hopes
 attached to the Russia of Nicholas I: "Entering the Russia of
 Nicholas I you would enter a coffin without any national life or
 any freedom." In several articles such as *The Foundations of*
a New Slavic Policy, *The Foundations of a Slavic Federation*,
The Interior Organization of Slavic Nations, and finally in his
Manifesto to the Slavs, he formulated his view on that future
 federation. He dreamt about the abolition of tsardom through
 Russian revolution, which was to be preceded by a Slavic revolu-
 tion. He thought that the Slavs under the leadership of a free
 Russia would fight against Austria, Turkey, Germany, Hungary,
 and even against the whole world if that were demanded by the
 interests of the Slavic Union. This Slavic Union was to contain
 not only Slavic peoples but also the Magyars and Greeks. It would
 be an Eastern world with Constantinople as its capital and it
 would be opposed to the Western world. The political regime of
 the Union would be republican but without a parliament, a dic-
 tatorship would be established especially because of Russia, which
 would be unable to reach a higher level of civilization without
 it.⁸³

These articles and his manifesto passed without any great effect.
 His striking idea of dictatorship representing a kind of anarchical
 despotism was an idea which obsessed him and which reappeared
 in different forms on many occasions during his life. He even
 admitted that a Russian tsar, Nicholas I or Alexander II, or a gen-
 eral, such as Murav'ev-Armursky or Nicholas Ignat'ev, might be
 a beneficent dictator over the Slavs. The next most important mani-
 festation of Bakunin's Panslavism took place after his Siberian
 exile, when in 1862 he published his revolutionary *Manifesto to*
Russian, Polish, and all Slavic friends. As a matter of fact,

⁸³ Polonsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 221-227.

186* he returned in this manifesto to his former ideas—of an agrarian
 668 revolution, of the abolishment of bureaucracy and the privileged
 classes and a federation of Slavic peoples. Characteristically
 enough, and this is what Kucharzewski stresses in his studies on
 Bakunin, Bakunin's relationship to Poland was a very peculiar
 phenomenon. He was attracted by Poles (in Siberia he married
 a young girl of Polish origin), he always spoke very warmly
 in his writings and manifestos to Poles, but on the other hand
 these contacts with Poles each time, just as during his rencontre
 with Lelewel, aroused in him Russian national feelings. I may
 add that in his youth he greatly admired Pushkin's anti-Polish
 odes. When discussing the social structure of the future Slavic
 federation, he strongly stressed the fact that that structure "will
 in no way be different from ours." It is clear enough that his
 manifesto expressing such views on the future of the "Slavs
 liberated by a revolutionary Russia" could not awake great en-
 thusiasm among them. Hence Bronislaw Zaleski, a distinguished
 Polish émigré, wrote a long answer to Bakunin's manifesto in
 which he said that: "Bakunin wants not only the abolishment
 of despotism but he also wants the destruction of everything
 which existed before, in other words he wants a deluge—and into
 the ark, which would save from this deluge a creative idea for
 mankind, he puts only the Russian village community with its
 common landownership as it had been formed in serfdom. Hence
 any individual property must be abolished forever. . . . How many
 ruins it will be necessary to make in order to prepare that vast
 pasturage—is what the new reformer does not take into con-
 sideration."⁷⁰³

Besides this, Bakunin pushed the Russian frontiers of his federa-
 tion so far into the West that indeed only a very small part of
 Poland would remain as a Polish entity in the Union. The Polish
 periodical *Review of Polish Affairs* ended its analysis of Baku-

⁷⁰³ Kucharzewski, *op cit.*, vol. II, p. 443.

PANSLAVISM

863

nin's manifesto by saying that "Russian revolutionism is, in its consequences for Poland, similar to Russian despotism."⁸⁴

186*
668

I shall not enter the further complication of his relations with the Poles, the details of his self-imposed activities in the Polish Insurrection of 1863, nor the mutual deceptions between himself and Poland.

After the Polish Insurrection the Panslavic conceptions played a less important role in the second part of his life with the exception of his program for the Slavic section of the International in Zürich in 1872.⁸⁵

8. Herzen (1812-1870)

Herzen also has some ties with Dostoevsky and these ties are to be found in his critique of the West and in his enthusiasm for the Russian village community which, as we know, was one of the chief objects of admiration of the Muscovite Slavophiles though they first heard of it from the German Haxthausen who in 1845 published his work on his travels in Russia. Herzen's cult of the Russian peasant, his populism, made of him a precursor of *narod-nichestvo*.

186*
829

That evolution was not quite simple—Herzen, before his trip to Europe and stay there, was one of the most enthusiastic Russian Westerners, and he very often opposed the Muscovite Slavophiles. His stay in Europe changed his opinions, and there he became one of the most violent fighters against *l'esprit bourgeois* of the Western civilization. The conception of the dying Western civilization became a kind of obsession with him and against these constantly drawn pictures of the chaos, agony, and disease of Europe suddenly arose in the mind of this former Westerner his Russian and even Slavophil messianism. To Chaadaev's formula that the past of Russia is empty, the present unbearable, and that she has no future, Herzen replied that the "past of the Russian

⁸⁴ Kucharszewski, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 412.

⁸⁵ Cf. Kucharszewski, *op. cit.*, and E. H. Carr, *M. Bakunin*, London, 1937.

186* people is dark; its present is terrible, but it has rights to the
 829 future." And he filled that future first of all with the hope that Russia would avoid the poison of Western Philistinism. "Philistinism—this is the last word of civilization, based on the absolute autocracy of property." Russia, by the fact that she knew only communal property, had indeed every possibility of avoiding the poisonous influences of the West.

Certainly Herzen's disgust for European Philistinism was in some degree justified, but the *esprit bourgeois* does not exhaust the content of the Western civilization. It is amazing to see how quickly that former Russian Westerner lost his psychological inclination toward Europe—toward the lights of European thought—toward the intellectual energy of Europe, its philosophy, arts, science, traditions of freedom.

In addition, Herzen had a deep belief in the essentially revolutionary mind of the Russians. "The thinking Russian is the most independent man in the world. What can stop him? Respect for the past? But what is the starting point of the history of modern Russia, if not the negation of nationality and tradition? On the other hand, the past of the Western nations has only a didactic value for us. We in no way consider ourselves the executors of their will. We share your doubts, but your faith does not warm us. We share your hatreds, but we do not understand your attachment to the heritage of your ancestors; we are too oppressed, too unhappy to be satisfied with half-freedom. You are bound by scruples, you are stopped by reservations of mind, we have no scruples, no reservations, we are lacking only in power."⁸⁶

We have here a kind of combination of Chaadaev's pessimism
 186* and the Muscovite Slavophiles' optimism. The essential idea of
 829 Herzen, a very Slavophil and very Russian idea, was that "the
 177 western fruit will ripen in the Slavic world." Kucharzewski, whom I quote, very justly states: "The West produces thoughts, Russia utilizes them; to the West is allotted the task of creating, to

⁸⁶ Kucharzewski, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 395-396.

PANSLAVISM

865

Russia—the role of leadership among future mankind, with the help of the ripe fruits of the work of other nations.”⁸⁷ 186*
859

When dealing with Herzen as well as with Tyutchev and Dostoevsky—but I think with Herzen even more than with the latter, one is really amazed to see how well and deeply he knew Europe. The more astonishing is, then, that lack of attachment and love for European tradition. They understand everything, but they love nothing. 177

All these thoughts were developed in Herzen's work *From the Other Shore* (1849), in his letter to Michelet, and a little later, in 1854, in his letter to Riberol, editor of the review *L'Homme*, and in his letter to Linton, editor of the *English Republic*. In this last publication he develops his Panslavic system in connection with the Crimean War. He states that Poland was the one Slavic country who preserved her independence. “Only Poland remained independent and strong, but this because she was less Slavic than the other nations, she was Catholic, and Catholicism is a flagrant contradiction of the Slavic genius. Hence Poland preserved independence by weakening her racial ties and by coming nearer to the Western states.”

One must not, forget however, that in 1863 and in 1864, as I mentioned before, Herzen in his *Kolokol* published the most penetrating articles filled with great sympathy and admiration for Poland and the Poles.⁸⁸ He greets the Crimean War as “the beginning of a Slavic era, the Slavs will raise the banner of Socialism, and Constantinople will be the capital of the united Slavs. . . . Constantinople is one real capital of the united Slavs, it is the Rome of the Eastern Church, the center of all Slavo-Greeks—Byzantium, surrounded by a Slavic-Hellenic population . . . In any case this war is the *introduzione maestosa e marziale* of the Slavic world into universal history and at the same time *una marcia funebre* of the old world.”⁸⁹

⁸⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 397.

⁸⁸ Lednicki, W.: “Russian-Polish Cultural Relations,” *New Europe*, 1944.

⁸⁹ Kucharszewski, *op. cit.*, pp. 399-400.

186* Yes, Herzen was certainly one of the most brilliant and penetrating singers of the Russian requiem for Europe, but even in this he was a pupil of the Europeans—of the Saint-Simonists, Fourier, Cabet, and Proudhon, who violently criticized contemporary European civilization. They did for Herzen what later in the seventies Renan did for Strakhov. Strakhov filled his book *The Struggle with the West in Our Literature* with Renan's criticism. But Renan did even more—he suggested some ideas to the Russians which they didn't forget. Strakhov quotes one of them: "There still exists in the world a reserve of barbarian forces, which are almost all in the hands of Russia. As long as the civilized nations conserve their solid organization, the role of these barbarians will be almost null; but without doubt, if (from which God preserve us!) an epidemic of selfishness and anarchy brings our western states to destruction, the barbarians will accomplish their duty, which consists in raising the many forces in spoiled civilizations, in producing the vivifying current of instinct which was lost when reflection destroyed subordination, to show that readiness to sacrifice one's life for faithfulness to one's sovereign (a deed which a democrat considers low and absurd) is a source of power and leads to the possession of the world."⁶⁰

The case of Herzen is particularly eloquent: it shows how demoralizing were the Slavophil and Panslavistic conceptions if a man of Herzen's caliber, Europeanism, and superior generosity could find himself in such a moral and spiritual impasse.

186* The ultimate expression of this eastern Messianism suggested by the Russian Westerners is to be found in the *Scythians*, a poetical message which Alexander Blok addressed to the West: "Now rejoicing, now sorrowing, now flowing with black blood, she (Russia) looks at you with hatred and with love. . . . We love everything—the heat of cold numbers and the gift of divine visions, everything appeals to us—the perspicacious Gallic thought and the gloomy German genius. . . . We remember everything—the hell of Parisian streets and the refreshing coolness of Venice,

⁶⁰ Strakhov, *Bor'ba s zapadom v nashey literature*, St. Petersburg, 1882, vol. 1, p. 324.

PANSLAVISM

867

the distant aroma of the lemon groves, and the smoky buildings ^{182*}
 in Cologne. . . . We love the body, the taste and the color of it, and ⁸²⁹
 its oppressive deadly odor. . . . Is it our fault if your skeleton ⁵³⁹
 cracks in our heavy, soft paws?"

9. Reactions Among the Slavs Toward Panalavic Conceptions

In the beginning of the nineteenth century the Southern Slavs ^{186*}
 attracted no great attention from the world. However, after the ¹⁷⁵
 Russian-Turkish wars of the time of Catherine II they began to
 move more distinctly on the political stage of Europe, as
 Pypin justly says.⁶¹ The fight of Serbia for her independence, the
 fight of the Montenegrins against the Turks and their resistance
 against the French (I am still following Pypin), Illyria established
 by Napoleon—all this revealed the existence of energetic Slayic
 elements in the Near East. To this should be added facts as Vuk
 Karadžić's collection of popular songs in which the deeds of Ser-
 bian national heroes were glorified. The fights of the Croatians
 against the Hungarians, the Russian intervention in the Hunga-
 rian Revolution of 1848, the part which Russia took in the libera-
 tion of Serbia, all created an atmosphere in which the Panalavistic
 conceptions could, of course, count on a sympathetic reaction.
 However, as far as the final results are concerned, Russian Pan-
 slavism was not at all successful even among the Southern Slavs.
 The Croatians, who in the forties when fighting against the Hun-
 garians were dreaming of "Slavic unity, very soon abandoned
 these dreams and looked more and more toward the West for
 help against Turkey. The Serbs in spite of their religious ties
 with Russia were returning closer and closer to the traditions of
 Obradović and of Vuk Karadžić and his reform which brought
 the Serbian cultural development away from Russian influences,
 and to conceptions of a national state, and of the building of a
 national culture. Russia's tactless approaches to Serbia, the Rus-

⁶¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 11.

186* sian tendency to consider Serbs as merely a new sort of Rus-
 175 sians and the Serbian intelligentsia a class which did not represent the real feelings of the people, and facts such as the Russian correspondents calling Serbs "Russians of Belgrade *gubernia*" clarified the situation so that the famous letter of Khomyakov to the Serbs from Moscow published in 1861 created a very unfavorable impression in Serbia; and this found its expression in the answer of the Serbian scholar Daničić.⁶²

In Bulgaria the situation has for centuries been even more complicated and dramatic because of the fact that when fighting for their national independence and national culture, the Bulgars had to fight against not only Turks but also Greeks. In spite of the activity of Venelin and the role which Russia played in the restoration of Bulgarian independence and the ties between Bulgarian intellectuals and Russian scholarship, the Panslavistic conceptions could not destroy the existence of strongly nationalistic tendencies.⁶³

Among the Czechs and Slovaks, where in spite of their deep and pathetic Germanization there appeared the first great scholars in the field of Slavic philology and history—Dobrovský, Šafařík, Palacký, Havlíček, and Jungmann (who, by the way, very often wrote in Latin and in German), the Panslavistic tendencies received a rather cold reception. As I mentioned above, it was only at the time of Jungmann, Rautenkranz, and Puchmajer that the pro-Russian feelings of the Czechs were strong—with Kollár giving in the most eloquent expression of these feelings. Palacký, as we know, was an advocate of a Slavic federation but under Austrian leadership. He was too close to the Western traditions to feel any enthusiasm for a conception which would bring all Western Slavs under Russian domination. Such was, by the way, the attitude of the Congress in Prague in 1848. This point of view

⁶² Pypin, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

⁶³ Here must also be stressed the religious pressure in Bulgaria coming from Constantinople and the fact that elements of national consciousness were preserved only among the people and the émigrés. Important, too, was the role of the monk, Paisiy, his activity on Mt. Athos, and his collection of Bulgarian legends, songs, historical documents, and his *History of Bulgaria*, of 1762.

PANSLAVISM

869

was formulated in *The Scientific Dictionary*, a Czech Encyclopedia.⁶⁴ The article referring to Panlavism is very reserved. The speculations of the Muscovite Slavophiles on the item of Hussism as a purely Slavic movement which presumably had its ties with Slavic Orthodoxy did not appear very convincing to the Czechs.

In general, the Prague Congress of 1848 reduced the Panlavic tendencies to a formula of political organization of Austria which would satisfy the national political demands of the Slavs. In this way was developed a special Austrian Panlavism directed against Russia and later called Austroslavism. The same trends might be discovered in the so-called "Slavic Union" in the Vienna Parliament of 1908. However, under the leadership of the Czech Kramář there developed at the same time the so-called neo-Slavism, which stressed the political solidarity of all Slavic nations on the condition of complete cultural equality, but which certainly contained pro-Russian tendencies. The movement was created in 1908 at the Slav Congress in Prague, followed by a Congress in Petersburg in 1909 and one in Sofia in 1910. There took place only vague and very general formulations of Slavic mutual respect, sympathy, and efforts to calm the inter-Slavic antagonisms—Russian-Polish, Serbo-Croatian, Serbo-Bulgarian, and so on. In spite of the participation in this movement of several important political leaders among the Slavs, it did not reach any concrete results. Most Poles and Russians very soon abandoned it. The War of 1914 brought again to the fore ideas of Slavic union, proclaimed this time by representatives of Russian public opinion and by the Russian government. I should also mention the outstanding activity aiming at spiritual and intellectual collaboration among the Slavs of the brilliant Polish scholar, thinker, and writer Marian Zdziechowski, who established his Slavic Club in Cracow with its review *The Slavic World* before the War of 1914 and who entertained close relations with the Russian sympathizers of these trends, about whom I shall speak below.

⁶⁴ Quoted by Pypin, *op. cit.*, pp. 152-153.

186* Almost at the same time there reappeared in Russia a spiritual,
575 idealistic, mystic approach to the Slavophil conceptions. It was a kind of continuation of neo-Slavic trends. One may find in the writings of distinguished and honest politicians, poets and writers such as V. I. Ivanov, S. N. Bulgakov, and Prince E. N. Trubetskoy items connected with this idealism and mysticism. These trends reappeared during the War of 1914. They were preceded by the old Muscovite "Society of Slavic Reciprocity" which was a quite honorable institution and by the subsequent "Society of Slavic Culture" in which the progressive elements among Russian and Polish politicians and scholars met, such as Professor Korsh, Prince E. N. Trubetskoy, Alexander Lednicki, and some others. The aim of this society was to pacify inter-Slavic relations primarily by the help of cultural activities.⁶⁵

186* Some of the Czechs belonging to the period preceding neo-Slavism, however, remained faithful to their pro-Russian feelings in face of the opposition of Palacký and Havlíček. So Kolár, who even in his *Slávy Dcera* excluded Emilia Plater, the Polish heroine of 1830-31, from paradise "because this sister fought against brothers, a Slav girl against Slavs," and yet, as Kucharszewski observes, granted a place in that paradise to Suvorov and Nicholas I, behaved quite disgustingly at the Slavic Congress in Moscow in 1867, where in the absence of the Poles he did his best to please their Russian persecutors.⁶⁶

186* Thus the Bohemian Panslavism found practically no expression
814 in the nineteenth century other than a purely scientific one—in the fields of Slavic archaeology, Slavic ethnography, Slavic philology, and Slavic history. I can devote no space to Slavic philology here, but I should like to stress the enormous achievements in this field of, besides the Czechs, Polish, Russian, and Serbian scholars, to whom should be added German, French, Italian, Eng-

⁶⁵ Details connected with neo-Slavism, with events preceding the First World War, the policy of Irvolaky, the activities of Count Bobrinskoy on one hand—and on the other, activities of people such as Dmowski among the Poles the attitude of the Ukrainians, and the situation in the Balkans preceding the War of 1914 may be found in Dr. Alfred Fischel's *Der Panslavismus bis zum Weltkrieg*, Berlin, 1919.

⁶⁶ Kucharszewski, *op. cit.*, vol. II, Warsaw, 1925, p. 308.

PANSLAVISM

871

lish, and recently American scholars.⁶⁷ From this point of view the Czechs might be considered those who prepared weapons for Panslavism. And even in our days the Czech scholars remain faithful to their conceptions of Slavic cultural unity. It should be stressed, however, that the most prominent advocate among the Western Slavs (with the exception of some Poles) was, as mentioned before, the Slovak Štur, who represents an integral Panslavism practically degenerating into Panrussianism.

S.P.
186*
814

10. Polish Reactions

The fate of the Slavophil and Panslavistic conceptions among the Poles has not been simple. Without going too far into the past or referring to Boleslaw the Great in whose policy one may find some elements connected with our subject, I shall abandon the effort to find some manifestations of interest for the Slavs in early Polish historians, such as Jan Dlugosz (fifteenth century), and leave aside some Polish plans for political union with Russia in the beginning of the seventeenth century.

P.
186*
175
648

A forecast of the full growth of Polish Slavophilism was contained in the interesting "Manifesto" of the Sandomierz confederation or "An Address to the Russian Nation," which was published about 1733, at the time when Poland's political power during the Northern War had begun to decline and Russia's to increase. In this manifesto the Poles, expressing in warm words their sympathy for the Russian nation's "yearning for liberty and freedom, and waiting for a favorable moment to abolish serfdom" "frankly encouraged" Russians "to rouse their knightly spirit." The manifesto stressed that the Polish country "wishes for nothing more than your progress and the freedom of the Russian nation."

⁶⁷ This information may be found in the studies on Slavic Philology of Jagić, Alexander Brückner, Frantaev, Mazon, Máchal, Lehr-Splawiński, W. Lednicki, A. P. Coleman, in different reviews such as *Archiv für slavische Philologie*, *Revue des Etudes Slaves*, *Le Monde Slave*, *Świat Słowiański*, *Przegląd Słowiański*, *Slavia*, *Slawische Rundschau*, *The Slavonic and East European Review*, and *The American Slavic and East European Review*.

176^a However, the really first classical manifestation of Slavophil-
 829^a ism in Poland, a manifestation which, by the way, preceded the
 Muscovite Slavophil school, is to be found in Stanislaw Staszic's
Thoughts on the Political Equilibrium of Europe, written in 1815.
 It is a work in which Staszic dealt with the problem of the future
 of Europe, Russia and Poland. He was aware of the catastrophe
 threatening contemporary civilization, he saw a possibility for the
 regeneration of mankind through the Slavs. His views of the
 three main European races, the Romanic, Teutonic and Slavic,
 led him to the conclusion that only the last of them was destined
 to bring about such a regeneration; the Romanic nations had, he
 held, become exhausted by the controversies which originated in
 the separation of the state from the church. The Germans, on the
 other hand, had lost their moral unity owing to their sectarianism,
 which was based on their "excessive inclination for metaphysics."
 He further emphasized "their indomitable spirit of conquest and
 their lust for cruelty, which would always have made lasting peace
 impossible in the world." The Slavic races were developing
 intensely; owing to their primitive culture they had suffered less
 from calamities, their inner union was always durable and they
 were supported by their "religious unity, which for the most part
 was blended with the secular power." Among the Slavic nations he
 gave the first place to Russians whose geographical position ren-
 dered them more secure and impregnable than the Poles, and whose
 Orthodox Church enjoyed a higher type of religion, harmoniously
 blending, as it did, the secular and ecclesiastical forces. At the
 same time he attributed great importance to the War of 1812
 which Russia "made into a Slavic war," thus showing to the world
 her inexhaustible power. Poland, in her turn, was destined to
 reveal that idea of unity which would have been realized by Rus-
 sia had she overcome the political temptation which had beset the
 German emperors, for such ambitions would only result "in wars
 between brethren and in bloodshed." Staszic might be indeed
 considered the precursor of the Muscovite Slavophiles; a still
 nearer approach to them may be found in the article published by

PANSLAVISM

873

J. Jaroszewicz in 1826: *On the Influence of the Christian Religion upon the Civilization of the Slavs*. Comparing the influence of Byzantium and Rome, Jaroszewicz found Eastern Christianity attractive, whereas he regarded Rome as a power that had destroyed all native power of the Slavs by forcing upon them the Latin language and foreign clergy. "Thus, although the chains of the new religion bound us (the Poles) to the rest of the European nations, yet after its introduction Poland was educated on foreign models, and the result was that the Poles have become foreign to themselves." Some decades later, "Latin Poland," "the unfaithful daughter of the Slavic race," was to suffer the same reproach from Moscow. On the other hand Jaroszewicz openly acknowledged the beneficent influence on Slavic life of the Greek church. Under that influence the Eastern Slavs preserved the habits and rites that had originated in the pagan period. The conclusion was immediate and plain: it was Russia alone that had kept the ancient tribal traditions. 186* 829

After the events of 1830 and 1846 Polish political thought reverted to principles which approached the systems of Staszic and Jaroszewicz, but of course very often for quite different motives. Limitation of space does not allow me to go into detail nor to quote the opinions of numerous writers who tried to elaborate Slavophil or Panslavic systems. I shall confine myself to only certain ones. Among them, Count Adam Gurowski deserves attention. For the sake of gain he became an apostate from his nation, and disclaiming his early activity (he took part in the Insurrection of 1831 and was one of the founders of the Polish Democratic Society in Paris), he accepted the amnesty, annoyed Paskevich, the Viceroy of Nicholas I in Poland at that time, by applying for remunerative posts, and wangled money from his acquaintances. Finally, during his stay abroad, in 1841-1848, he published a number of dissertations. Inspired by hatred of the Germans, he defended Panslavism and Panrussianism and tried to prove that the former was a historical necessity and that the Russian conquests aimed only at establishing the total independence

186* of the Slavs from foreign influence. The imperialistic Russian
 829 tendencies were only an expression of the principle of defense
 and of reaction against invasion. He thought that "the archangel
 of independence seemed to have left old Poland forever; there
 was, however, some future for the ancient Polish nation if it could
 be dissolved with no matter how great pain and suffering into
 Russo-Slavism." He looked with particular sympathy on the Or-
 thodox Church, he thought it much superior to Protestantism,
 which was split into fragments, and to Catholicism. He considered
 that the Orthodox tenets depended on a sincere faith in Christ and
 on tradition. Gurowski considered even that the Polish language
 when compared to the Russian revealed its decadence and se-
 nility. He suggested substituting in Poland the Russian language
 for the Polish—this to be preceded by the introduction of the
 Slavic language in order to make the change less drastic.

The views of the second Polish Panslavist of the same period,
 Wacław Jabłonowski, were very similar. A disappointed mon-
 archist, a pessimist in his views on Poland's future, a man who
 suffered from a nervous disease, he came to the same conclusion
 —that the only genuinely Slavic current was that of the East, the
 Russian and Asiatic, which incorporated the deepest tribal char-
 acteristics of the Slavs, who had come from Asia, and belonged to
 the Asiatic system by their character, their political tendencies
 and their commercial connections. The views show some like-
 ness to the so-called Eurasian doctrine which appeared among
 the Russian emigrants between the last two World Wars. Jab-
 łonowski was very aggressive. In a French book propagating the
 idea of a Slavic-Russian empire under the leadership of the Tsar
 with a capital in Kiev, he suggests the organization of Slavic move-
 ments in the Balkans and an invasion of the West: "This move-
 ment might very easily coincide with some decisive step in the
 eastern question. A small army corps may cross the Danube and
 support movements arising on the other side. Europe, Germany
 and France, will utter a great cry; the latter will perhaps be
 obliged to break her alliance. That will be the culmination of

PANSLAVISM

875

the crisis. Then the Tsar will come to Poland, take the title of ^{186*}
the Tsar of the Slavs and proclaim the union of these nations. ⁸²⁹
The enthusiasm of the Polish army and of the Polish nation will
have no limits. . . . You may believe me that on the day when
Tsar Nicholas launches his Cossacks from Cracow at a gallop with
the *knut* in one hand and a bag of rubles in the other, the Cos-
sacks will stop only on the other border of the Austrian empire:
nothing will resist him on the road. . . . This revolution will fall
on Europe like a thunderbolt. . . . " (Cf. J. Kucharzewski, *op. cit.*
vv. II and III).

The most original and outstanding Polish Pan Slavist was Joseph ^{186*}
Maria Hoene-Wroński, one of the creators of Polish messianistic ⁸²⁹
philosophy. His philosophy originated in Hegel's dialectic meth- ⁸¹²
ods and was based on the principles of the threefold development
—thesis, antithesis and synthesis—as applied to history by Schel-
ling; and it was in its essence rather teleological. Influenced by
the creative philosophy of Fichte and Schelling, Hoene-Wroński
replaced the idea of infinite progress by the conception of a pur-
poseful development of humanity which aimed at bringing about
God's kingdom on earth and the achievement of immortality. He
distinguished three periods. There was first the tendency to realize
relative aims. Material welfare, for example was the goal of the
Oriental states. Then comes the necessity of securing the welfare
attained. This led to the conception of justice, which formed the
moral aim of the classical period of Greece and Rome, and to
the development of the Christian ideals of the Middle Ages;
finally there was knowledge—the spiritual goal of the period
which heralded the Reformation. The second period was marked
by absolute aims, but this tendency was still immature and split
into two ineffective currents of thoughts: one, which regarded
feeling and good as the absolute aim, was based on revelation;
while the other aimed at reason and truth and rested on experi-
ence. The first current became in practical life "illiberal," the
second, "liberal," and the conflict between them furnished the
basis for the "social antinomy." The third period would represent

186* the union of absolute good and absolute truth. Such is the law
 829 of development, and it must be understood if the goal is to be
 812 reached. Messianism is but an exponent of this law, that is, a
 condition of the further development, a factor which can help to
 create reality. In this way philosophy leaves the field of know-
 ledge and enters the field of action. It is the mission of the Slav
 world, with Russia at its head, to embark on this philosophy and
 to realize it. Russia aided by the Slav world is to blend the two
 contemporary associations of men, state and church, into an "ab-
 solute union" which, in its turn, will solve the "social antinomy."⁸⁸

186* The ideas of Hoene-Wroński were also drawn from his views
 829 on the contemporary state of Europe; he thought that Europe was
 in a critical condition and threatened to collapse. The western
 nations had produced two destructive ideas which were bound to
 bring catastrophe,—the French idea of the autocracy of the peo-
 ple, the German philosophic dogma of the infallibility of reason.
 The Slavs had twice appeared as the defenders of mankind. They
 had stopped the advance of both Islam and of Jacobinism, prov-
 ing that they were chosen by God to perform the unification of
 the different tendencies of mankind: "The absolute destiny of
 France consists in the realization of the state. The absolute des-
 tiny of Germany consists in the realization of the church: the ab-
 solute destiny of Russia consists in the realization of their absolute
 union."⁸⁹

By the way, these ideas about the kingdom of God on earth are
 an exact anticipation of the analogous views of Vladimir Solov'ev,
 and an eloquent forecast of the latter's theocratic philosophy of
 history with its tendency toward Caesaropapism. It would be
 possible to cite here several other names of writers involved in the
 same ideas. I think, however, that the three men whom I have men-
 tioned are the most representative. These Pan Slavist systems, even
 though not all of them were of the same merit and importance,
 flowed from a common spring, an excessive concern for national

⁸⁸ J. Kleiner, *Zygmunt Krasiński*, Lwów, 1909, Vol. II, pp. 85-87.

⁸⁹ *Messianisme ou Réforme absolue*, Vol. I, pp. 22-23.

PANSLAVISM

877

and European crises. But they had something more in them than that, particularly the system of Hoene-Wroński. At the bottom there was an exaggerated desire for self-sacrifice, a profound love for the misty and chimerical ideas of a universal happiness to which the Slavs were destined to lead mankind, and in particular, the western communities. In the cause of those ideals Poland was to be the victim of a fantastic self-immolation. There we see a significant difference between Polish and Russian Panslavists. The Russian thinkers looked with contempt upon the "rotten West" (while the Poles obviously constructed their systems on behalf of the West). Staszic, and especially Hoene-Wroński had in mind universal aims, but detached from Polish imperialism or Panpolonism. A further difference is traceable to the fact that the Polish Slavophiles sacrificed national egoism for higher purposes in their desire to be consistent with their philosophic systems. And thus, whether it was acceptable to the Polish nation or not, they found some consistent solution to the Russo-Polish problem. Finally another difference should be stressed—that the Russian Slavophiles and Panslavists were all, in their private lives, honest men and quite independent of the Russian government. The same cannot be said of some of the Poles whom I have mentioned above. It must be added, nevertheless, that the Poles, almost without exception, were different from the healthy, fat, and comfortable Russian Slavophiles; they were confused, nervous, excessively sensitive emigrants, sad and despairing exiles who had been compelled to taste of every kind of humiliation and to suffer every kind of trial. There is no need to add that the Polish Panslavists were in disaccord with the majority of the nation, which could not accept the sacrifice of the national self. The best reaction to these Polish political thoughts may be found in the writings of Lelewel, Mickiewicz, Krasiński and Slowacki, in which there will appear different formulations of conceptions of Slavic solidarity and unity; but in all of them the belief in the creative, dynamic powers of the Polish nation will be preserved.

For Lelewel, the Russian-Polish conflict represents the conflict

EUROPEAN IDEOLOGIES

186* 878 For Lelewel, the Russian-Polish conflict represents the conflict
829 between the ancient Slavic liberty as preserved by the Poles, and
648 the Mongol despotism that has enslaved Russia. He pointed out, however, that Poland, influenced by the magnates and the Jesuits, had run counter to her own republican principles, that this had caused her collapse, and that in her recent fight with tsardom the sympathies of Russian public opinion were with Poland. This, by the way, had been violently denied by Pushkin (Lelewel mentioned his name) who confessed that "*l'accolade de Lelewel me paraît plus dure qu'un exil en Sibérie.*"

Mickiewicz went through different phases as far as his attitude towards Russia was concerned. During his exile in Russia he favored some conceptions of "fraternity" of nations and believed in the possibility and, of course, the necessity of the pacification of Russian-Polish relations. However, he was always strongly opposed to Russian autocracy. The Insurrection of 1830-1831, the complications of his personal life, the religious crisis through which he passed during his stay in Rome gave rise to his gloomy opinion of Russia's history in his *Forefather's Eve, Part III*, particularly in the *Digression*. Subsequently he limited his aversion to Russia's political system and tried to overcome his hatred of Russia.

[544] In his lectures at the Collège de France from 1840-1844, he expounded his views on Russia which he now enlarged with historical and political arguments of a precise and penetrating nature. These lectures dealt especially with Poland and the role which she was destined to play in the future of Slavic world. His conception of his native country grew more and more exalted. He regarded her as a martyred nation destined for the sake of humanity to rescue it by her suffering, a nation fated to lead the human race from the "Kingdom of the Old Testament" into that of the Gospel. This view led Mickiewicz to consider Poland as a representative of all that was most creative and fertile in the Slav world, and Russia as the natural "antithesis" of Poland—and hence, the antagonist of the Slav world and of all mankind. He saw the origins of the Russo-Polish antagonism even in the pre-Christian

PANSLAVISM

879

period, expressed in the shape of the two Gods, the "black" and the "white"; their dualism was reflected in the splitting up of the Slavic language into Russian and Polish "dialects." This dualism was strengthened by the alien influences which formed the Slavic states. With regard to the different structural characteristics of the states of the Lechs (Poles) and the Norsemen from their early existence, Mickiewicz sketched the history of the struggle between these two nations for the possession of the northern lands. Catholicism and Orthodoxy only deepened the already existing cleavage. The territory separating Poland from Moscow had been in dispute between them ever since Ivan III. Religion was an instrument, an obstacle, a pretext, but it never was the real basis of the dispute. However, the schism which separated the Greek and the Roman churches had intensified the earlier diversions in the spiritual culture of Russia and of Poland, a cleavage caused by the structures of the two states. The complete dependence of the Orthodox clergy on the secular power nullified any influence which they might have exerted on the spiritual growth of the Russian community. "The Catholic clergy, full of inexhaustible zeal, won in Poland the political liberties which subsequently spread to the other social classes. Whereas the old Bulgarian language segregated Russia from the influences of European civilization, the introduction of Latin among the Western Slavs established a vital contact between Poland and Bohemia and Western civilization, and stimulated the development of the languages and national literatures of these countries."⁷⁰

On the other hand he also stressed the Mongol influence upon Russian mentality. Mickiewicz conclusively proved that that Russian despotism which was fundamentally opposed to the Polish idea of patriotism and Polish traditions of civil liberty. This patriotism and love of liberty, and finally, the conviction that the individual conscience must be the highest form in the national life, were based upon the Christian principle of belief in

⁷⁰ I am following here, in general, "Poland and the Slavophil Idea." Cf. Z. Klarner, *Slowianofilstwo w Literaturze Polakiej lat. 1800-1848*, Warsaw, 1926, pp. 175-177.

186* the close communion of man with God. Hence, whereas Polish
 829 political thought is entirely spiritualized, the Mongol principle
 177 of autocracy has triumphed in Russia; it has created the immense
 181 material power which, if this principle were to prevail, would
 threaten the world with universal serfdom. In other words Mickiewicz was a pessimist as far as Slavophilism is concerned; the Russo-Polish antagonism broke the unity of the Slavic world. He foresaw, nevertheless, a possible solution. Only by a change from without in her religious mentality could Russia be transformed. Mickiewicz believed in the coming of a new epoch of universal religious rebirth, which was to effect the reconciliation of the divided Slavs. This hope seemed to him quite reasonable. The "heroism of serfdom," Russia's heroic obedience, the intensity of her religious life, allowed him to prophesy that the looked-for religious regeneration would include Russia.

186* Violently aggressive to Russia were some other Polish Slavophile theorists, eliminating Russia from their systems either
 829 because Russia embraced in the early days of her history the political principles of the Scandinavians and worshipped the power of the monarch and the descendants of Odin, and as such was the Anti-Christ of the Slav world; or because of her ethnic consistence: the theory of Duchiński considered Great Russians non-Slavs by reason of the supremacy of their Finnish and Mongolian elements.

A vehemently anti-Russian attitude was taken by Count Zygmunt Krasiński, an aristocrat and conservative, a westerner, a profoundly ardent Catholic and at the same time a messianist, and one of the greatest Polish poets and thinkers. His main idea was that the Polish nation was destined to introduce the gospel into the public law of Europe showing . . . that the incarnate word of God is law for empires as well as for individuals. This idea was later developed by Solov'ev in Russia. Krasiński thought that Polish martyrdom prepared Poland for the practical and concrete foundation of this principle in political life. In his dramas and in his political memoranda he fought against material-

PANSLAVISM

881

ism, showing the tragic picture of the European proletariat, "the ^{186*} modern slaves," torn from the cross by a materialism which pro-829
mised them an earthly paradise, actually unattainable—lacking the light of knowledge and faith, and concentrating all their hopes upon the force of numbers, upon the division of estates, on the abolition of property, upon the destruction of the family, and relying upon violence alone. Only religion could secure individual equality and the brotherhood of nations. He also became in a way a philosopher of the Russian-Polish antagonism. Moscow, which in its childhood dreamed of heroic deeds, "of the western glory of Knights," of "conquering the conquerors," was in later years, "when adolescent," subjugated by the Mongols and could not shake off their yoke. He depicts further the progressive triumph of autocracy, which gradually embraced the whole nation and became settled in space and in time. According to Krasiński there were two main sources of Russian mentality and culture. The first was Byzantium, which seemed to the poet a symbol of the moral decay of the Roman empire in all its aspects, its "validity," its "sense of art," its "acute sensitiveness"; the human soul in Byzantium became so mean that even Christianity became unable to breathe new life into it. The second parent of Russian culture, the Mongol world of Genghis Khan and Tamerlane, "found a sovereign power only in destruction"; it had no idea of God, but it knew terrifying rulers "who changed by slaughter the most fertile and most populated countries into deserts." "In Russian history the passive mother was Byzantine conservatism; the father who made her fruitful was the Tartar invasion; their product, which grew to gigantic proportions, was the Russian government." This government instinctively employed "whatever is evil in good things" whenever liberty declined to the level of violence. It loved not liberty but casual license. It admired and championed any oppression, revolutionary or monarchical, so long as it was oppression. It organized its troops in a Prussian manner, and like the French revolutionaries terrorized its citizens. "Wherever it traced Satan's footsteps in Europe, it stopped to examine

186* them and took its measure from them." "Having made a supreme
 829 priest of itself," in the person of Peter the Great, "it displayed
 itself abroad," that is, it attempted "to destroy the only work of
 God in Europe." It began to abolish nationalism, which by its body
 separated Russia from Europe, by its soul kept her from de-
 ceiving all the Slavs, by its spirit nullified the probability of a
 victory over the human race.

Contemplating with horror a future in which Russia might win
 the victory, Krasinski cast his speech into the form of a prophecy.
 Thus in the memorandum to Napoleon III during the Crimean War
 he said: "... In case of a pacific solution Russia will find for-
 midable auxiliaries in the fire of anarchy which she will then
 continue to animate everywhere, and in the very nature of things
 created by nearsightedness, by wealth, by agitations of misery and
 by that complete moral prostration about which I just spoke.
 Therefore all possibility for the future will henceforth be granted
 to this power. Gifted with an incomparable sagacity, as far as
 destruction is concerned it will not let escape a single occasion to
 turn to its profit all the hatreds and envies of our time. It will
 know admirably well how to exploit on one side the hopes of the
 legitimists and on the other the fury of demagogy. ... Then will
 come the day of the explosion—then there will come another day
 when Europe, covered with blood and ruins, will collapse under
 the weight of a thousand crimes and a thousand disasters; then
 the mistaken conservatives imagining that the Russian government
 represents order, will indicate it as a liberator and at the same
 moment the Socialists, recognizing in it their true master, will
 greet it by the name of the supreme initiator. It will fool every-
 one and everyone will fall at its feet." In another passage speak-
 ing about Russia Krasinski says: "Humiliated and unmasked, but
 not weakened, she will henceforth try to make use of other weap-
 ons and before renewing her unsuccessful attack against Constan-
 tinople she will prepare more obscure and more efficient roads.
 She will stretch out her hand to all secret societies, to all con-
 spiracies, to all shadowy plots from one end of Europe to the

PANSLAVISM

883

other. She will pay them with her gold and support them by her critiques—in a word, she will put her whole power at the service of the social revolution with the aim of precipitating from the throne the dynasties which recently disdained her alliance."⁷¹

There are indeed some striking passages in this prophetic memorandum. "The whole role which is played by the demagogical party in the breast of every European nation was accepted by Russia long ago and in measure much more gigantic toward all these nations taken together. She also announces an unknown era; she also proclaims another God, another church, the coming of a new society, religion as the slave of the temporal power, the soul subordinate to the body, the destruction of every aristocracy, the obliteration of the individual from the book of life, the realization of absolute equality, it is true at the cost of the most execrable of tyrannies, but unobtainable in a different manner here below; finally, the idea of property erased from the organization of labor—and as a crown for this system, the enjoyments of the brute accorded as a unique consolation to mankind . . . Russia . . . it is the arisen revolution, organized, disciplined, armed with a million bayonets knocking at the doors of the world! If one is not on guard, if she is not stopped in time, sooner or later she will reach her aims. . . ."⁷²

Kraśiński was aware of the fact that the affinities he stressed between revolution and the Russia of Nicholas I, could appear paradoxical to the people to whom he addressed his memoranda. Therefore in his memorandum to Napoleon III he says that the fact the Russian government had too solemnly proclaimed its principles does not prevent it from following such a course of action. He stressed that "the only principle of that government is to have no principles at all, and that ever since a secret and profound affinity has existed between the Russian Genius and the revolutionary Genius."⁷³

⁷¹ *Pisma Zygmunta Kraśińskiego*, Vol. VII, Kraków, 1912, pp. 316-317.

⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 317-318.

⁷³ *Op. cit.*, p. 317.

186*
829

186*
829

In his opinion Russia had only one dream—that of a universal monarchy and nothing would ever oblige the government which rules Russia to abandon “the monstrous idea of introducing itself in Europe through interior destruction, wrought by parties which would tear apart the civilized states, and of planting its victorious eagles on the fragments of ruins or on heaps of mud accumulated by the baseness of some, by the unskilfulness of others, and the discord of all. Its very ideal is the triumphal march of Fortinbras at the end of the fifth act of *Hamlet*, arriving almost unknown, where there were none but the dead, and succeeding to them by an unheard concurrence of strange fatalities.” (Cf. the article *Deux Puissances*.)⁷⁴

In another article he stresses the same idea that Russia waits for the decomposition of Western civilization; Russia waits for the moment when Europe, “exhausted by cruel wars, social conflicts, injustice, bribery, and spoliation will call her and surrender to her.” “Then with its Asiatic foot she will stamp upon Europe and will give to the Europeans, tubercular, miserable, exhausted, lying in smoking ruins and amidst puddles of blood, the *Krut* to kiss. Then Moscow, convinced that nothing more will resist her, that all the prophesies of Peter the Great are realized, will start to rage but so loathesomely and so inhumanely again that she will awake the last despair in Europe.”⁷⁵

It is unfortunately impossible to follow Krasiński further because of lack of space. These examples are striking enough, but actually one may read almost the same things in the articles of Karl Marx published in New York at the time of the Crimean War. Krasiński was an aristocrat, a conservative and a Catholic—and I need not explain who Marx was. Krasiński was led by a fear of revolution organized by Russia. Marx counted on revolution to destroy all despotisms in Europe and first of all, Russian despotism. Who was right, in the long run, that is the question. Before coming to Marx, I should like to add that Krasiński

⁷⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 175-176.

⁷⁵ *Poland in the Face of Storm*. *Op. cit.*, pp. 277-78.

186* might be considered a Slavophil whose views might be compared
 829 to the views of the Muscovite Slavophiles—with, however, the significant reservation that he attributed to Poland the role which the Slavophiles gave to Russia. He eliminated Russia entirely from his system and saw Poland's historical mission in the liberation and preservation of different Slavic nations from Russia's imperialism. To the moral decline of Russia Krasinski opposed Poland which, he maintained, had foreshadowed the future ideal, the unification of republic with kingdom, of democracy with aristocracy, of pagan classicism with the Christian spirit. This unification was manifested in a series of heroes, Zamoycki, Zolkiewski and Sobieski. Poland, in fact, had blended the Roman type with the Christian. These ideas Krasinski expressed in a letter to Montalembert and they represent from a certain point of view the Polish classical formulations of Polish culture. When compared to the conceptions of the Muscovite Slavophiles and Panславists, especially to the conceptions of writers like Aksakov, Nadezhdin, Danilevsky, Tyutchev, and Dostoevsky, they represent a flagrant contradiction.

Of course this was, to say the least, a very abstract idea. In other words, whereas Mickiewicz eliminated Russia from his Slavic system only temporarily, because he believed in her religious and moral rebirth, Krasinski did so irrevocably. The
 186* Polish Slavophil systems eliminating Russia as a Slavic state
 829 from the other Slavic nations may now be said to have begun.
 668 The same standpoint was adopted by Slowacki in his *Letter to Prince Adam Czartoryski* and in the second "rhapsody" of *King Spirit*. Upon the same premises Trentowski, the Polish philosopher, founded his philosophy of history, and the opinions of Tyssynski and Heltman were similar. So, too, the above-mentioned Duchinski argued that Russia was not a Slavic country because of her relationship with the Asiatic nations. Turning for his article to the map of Karamzin, he considered the line of the Dnieper to be the eastern frontier of the Slav world, the center of which was historically Poland. The Polish Walter Scott, I. J.

886

EUROPEAN IDEOLOGIES

186*
829
668 Kraszewski, and the brilliant essayist Julian Klaczko followed similar lines, in so far as they endeavored to belittle Russia and to represent her as surrounded by other Slav states whose destiny was to check the imperialistic expansion of tsardom. It was this anti-Russian current of Polish political thought which animated the group known as the Democratic Society; and its tradition has survived in certain analogous political tendencies up to the modern times.

But on the other hand one must not forget that the Polish Pan-slavic conceptions as well as the Russian ones were deeply connected with the weakness of the policy of Western Europe, especially France and England, toward Russia. This weakness discouraged the Poles and encouraged the Russians. Especially critical were, of course, the years of the Polish Insurrections and between them, the years of the Crimean War.

11. Marx (1818-1883)

000 The policies of the Russian government and of the Western powers affected not only Poles and Russians, but European public opinion as well. I need not recall the fanatic enthusiasm of Paris at the time of the Russians' presence in France after the Napoleonic Wars, the French aristocratic ladies riding horseback with the Cossacks to show their admiration for Russia (the *Cosakée* French girl, to use the expression of Alfred de Vigny), the yielding attitude of the same public opinion in 1831, which provoked indignation among the best Europeans in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and England (cf. my books; *Pouchkine et la Pologne*, and *Life and Culture of Poland*), and later when Tyutchev published his article in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*. A little before that time C. Robert, the successor to Mickiewicz's chair at the Collège de France, started the publication in the same *Revue des Deux Mondes* of a series of articles devoted to Panslavism. He went through a peculiar evolution in these articles. The first part of his study contains elements of acceptance of the Russian interpreta-

PANSLAVISM

887

tion of Panslavism. He stresses the fact of existing mutual un-000
 understanding between the most distant Slavs, the unity of geography; he constantly mentions the "Greek-Slavic world"; he calls the Russians "the Greeks who emigrated to the North"; he compares the Russian *izvozchiks* to the Hellenes, etc. On the other hand, in the second part of his article he suddenly declares that "there is an abyss between the Spartan Slav of Montenegro and the *mouzhik* of Muscovia."⁷⁶ He calls Poland the France of the Graeco-Slavic world, protests against the Russian policy in Poland, Russian "cruelties" in Poland, expresses the opinion that it was only the "apathy and unexplainable indifference of western Europe" which let Russia have such an absolute ascendancy in the affairs of the Slavs, and he comes to the point that Poland should be the representative for Europe of the Slavic world and that Poland has a "sacred right to become the head of the coalition of all oppressed people." Hence his ultimate formula of Panslavism is a union of oppressed Slavs against the tsarist Panslavism. There are here and there in his vacillating study some very just remarks about, for instance, the paradoxical play of geography and culture in the case of Poland: the anti-Slavic enthusiastic Polish Latinism flowering in a completely uncovered and defenceless plain surrounded by the Germans and the Russians. This vision leads him sometimes to pessimism and he is ready to believe that the only condition for Poland's rebirth is Poland's reconciliation with oriental ideas. On the other hand, he perspicaciously loathes the significance of some social and economic reforms and manoeuvres applied by Russia to the conquered provinces, aiming at Russification.

Some few years later appeared, as I mentioned before, Tyutchev's article: *Rome and the Roman Question*. The Polish Library in Paris launched an anonymous answer under the title, *La Russie considérée au point de vue européen*. Unfortunately I do not know who the author was, but he did not confine his polemic to Tyutchev alone—he also had something to say about one of the

⁷⁶ *Revue des deux Mondes*, 1846, p. 478.

000 French collaborators of the *Revue*, M. Desprez, who was in charge of Slavic problems in the *Revue*. M. Desprez represented exactly the same attitude that has reappeared in our times in the form of so-called political realism. He not only accepted the accomplished facts but even justified them. "The Hungarians were broken against impossibility." Russia and Austria represented justice. With Poland—"infernal freedom" was the source of disaster. "To raise Poland again would be the most hazardous enterprise." The enslavement of Poland does not represent any menace for Europe. France could not help either the Hungarians or the Poles, because she would thus compromise her relations with the immense and generous race of the Slavs. In answer to other similar assertions the anonymous author of the pamphlet says: "They insult Poland who has loved France so much, and they adore Russia who asserts that France does not know what she wants. If you lack courage to be just toward Poland, be at least indifferent. Prostrate yourself, if you like, before tsarism, but at least do not spit in the face of the victim; this does not give you any advantage and does not bring you any honor. . . . They fear Socialism and Communism in the West, but Russia is a power which has to a great degree applied Communism; and by the most strange aberration, there are in Europe parties which place themselves under Muscovite protection. . . . In the West it is possible only to dream of or discuss socialism. Russia has it: this is the law of the state. The tsar is the only universal and real proprietor. . . . We do not know whether or not Communism will be established in the West, we doubt it; but if it one day establishes itself, Russia has laid broad and solid foundations for that deadly or beneficent transformation."⁷⁷

One cannot but be surprised to read such texts, realizing that they were written in 1850.

The "disastrous weakness" of the Western powers was also attacked from another side. One may find in the voluminous book of Karl Marx—*The Eastern Question* (London, 1897), containing

⁷⁷ *Op. cit.*, Paris, 1851, pp. 21, 41.

PANSLAVISM

389

his articles written in London and published in the *New York Tribune* in the years of the Crimean War—the most fascinating texts, especially when read in the light of the present day. Let us take this for instance: "Russia has all along been glorified for the forbearance and generosity of her 'august master,' who has not only condescended to cover the naked and shameful subservieney of Western Cabinets, but has displayed the magnanimity of devouring Turkey piece by piece, instead of swallowing her at one mouthful. Russian diplomacy has thus rested on the timidity of Western statement, and her diplomatic art has gradually sunk into so complete a *mannerism*, that you may trace the history of the present transactions almost literally in the annals of the past."⁷⁸

He continues, saying: "Russia now claims occupation of the Danubian Principalities, without giving to the Porte the right of considering this step as a *casus belli*. Russia claimed, in 1827, to occupy Moldavia and Wallachia *in the name of the three powers*. . . . Russia announced in her manifesto, October 10th, 1829: 'Russia has remained constantly a stranger to every desire of conquest—to every view of *aggrandizement*.'"

In another letter he quotes a letter of Count Pozzo di Borgo written on November 28th, 1828, to Count Nesselrode: "It is our policy to see that nothing new happens during the next four months, and I hope we shall accomplish it, because *men in general prefer waiting*; but the fifth must be fruitful in events." And then Marx says: "Having kept them (the courts of Europe) in this manner for weeks, nay for months, in suspense, Nicholas suddenly makes a declaration that neither England nor France nor Austria nor Prussia has any concern with his quarrel with Turkey, and that with Turkey he alone can negotiate . . . but while he declares that the powers are not to meddle in Russia's concerns, we are informed, on the other hand, that the representatives of France, England, Austria, and Russia killed their time by meeting in conference at Vienna, and in hatching projects for the ar-

⁷⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 48.

000 rangement of the Eastern question, neither the Turkish nor Russian ambassador participating in these conferences."⁷⁹ In this most interesting book one may find striking details showing how the Russian government was organizing its subversive propaganda in the Balkans. The Russian historian, M. N. Pokrovsky, also brings many details connected with the preparation for the Crimean War by Nicholas I, and illustrating that subversive activity of Russian diplomacy in Serbia and Athens. He justly says: "The head of European legitimism quickly stepped into the new role of a revolutionary agitator on the Balkan peninsula."⁸⁰

Not less convincing and even fascinating are the details connected with the same Crimean War brought by the contemporary Russian historian Tarle.⁸¹

Marx saw the whole situation from a very lucid point of view. He was trying to convince his American readers just as writers in *The New Leader* are now trying to do. Marx asserted that those of his readers who followed his correspondence from London "will have learned before that the idea of Russian diplomatic supremacy owes its efficiency to the imbecility and the timidity of the Western nations, and that the belief in Russia's superior military power is hardly less a delusion." We know how fully Marx's views were confirmed by the events of the Crimean War. How just indeed was Marx when with the genuine emotion of a great political mind he said: "Both (England and France) together have been frightened out of the only policy which would at once have guaranteed the preservation of peace, while maintaining their own respectability. To the arrogance of the autocrat they have replied with the symptoms of cowardice. They have encouraged the very assumptions they have depreciated, just as poltroons always encourage bullies to be overbearing. If at the outset they had used a manly style of language, adequate to the positions

⁷⁹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 76-77.

⁸⁰ *Istoriya Rossii v XIX Veka*, Vol. III, p. 33.

⁸¹ E. Tarle, "Nakanune Krymskoi Voyny," *Krasnaya Nov'*, nos. 11-12, 1940, pp. 260-270.

PANSLAVISM

891

they hold, and the pretensions they set up before the world, if 000 they had proved that cluster and swagger could not impose on them, the autocrat would not only have refrained from attempting it, but would have entertained for them a very different feeling from that contempt which must now animate his bosom. . . . There is only one way to deal with a power like Russia, and that is the fearless way."⁸²

Marx's optimism had sources very similar to those which inspired the Polish radical and democratic Slavophiles and Panslavists and, of course, men like Herzen and Bakunin—this was the hope for revolution. "Russian policy, with its traditional craft, cheats, and subterfuges, may impose upon the European courts, which are themselves but traditional things, but it will prove utterly powerless with the revolutionized peoples." "Western Europe is feeble and timid because her governments feel that they are outgrown and no longer believed in by their people. The nations are beyond their rulers and trust in them no more. It is not that they are really imbecile, but that there is new wine working in the old bottles. With a worthier and more equal social state, with the abolition of caste and privileges, with free political constitutions, unfettered industry, and emancipated thought, the people of the West will rise again to power and unity of purpose, while the Russian colossus itself will be shattered by the progress of the masses and the explosive force of ideas. There is no good reason to fear the conquest of Europe by the Cossacks. . . ."⁸³

From the Marxian texts quoted above there appears distinctly first of all the salient Westernism of Marx, and, of course, his anti-Panslavism. He stressed the Western "unity of purpose," and he expresses the conviction that one need not fear the "conquest of Europe by the Cossacks." This becomes extremely significant in the light of modern historical developments. What kind of Marx has been applied by Russia? It is clear that the Panslavic trends favored now in Soviet Russia are in conflict with Russia's

⁸² *Op. cit.*, pp. 187-188.

⁸³ *Op. cit.*, p. 80 and 189.

000 political gospel. One may wonder what would be the attitude of Marx in the face of present events, and one has some right to wonder if Marx would not now write about the "Soviet Autocrat" and the "weakness of pusillanimity" of the Western powers in exactly the same terms.

The above mentioned Russian historian Tarle quotes, in his study *On the Eve of the Crimean War*, a very interesting letter which Nicholas I wrote to his wife on June 7th, 1844, from Windsor at the time when he paid his visit to England: "Very comical things are taking place here in connection with the Poles. At the present moment there is being collected a subscription for a ball given by swindlers: at the head of the subscription list is the name of the Duchess of Somerset who even offered her house for the ball, and the name of the Duchess of Sutherland. All these events had taken place before my arrival; since I have been here the wind has changed; all these ladies have become afraid that they may defame themselves in the face of the majority of the public which receives me so nicely. And what did they think: the Duchess of Somerset writes to Brunnov (the Russian ambassador) that she is desolate that she permitted herself to be so misled that her name appears on the list and that she has asked to have it crossed off. Many have acted in the same way. I ordered that she be asked not to do anything like that and that even if the subscription does not cover the expenses of this enterprise, I shall be ready to complete the sum. Judge for yourself what was the effect and what was their confusion."

At the same time Herzen wrote in his diary: "Ostrowski (a famous Polish émigré, and translator of Mickiewicz) has been arrested during the sojourn of the Emperor. Such is the *habeas corpus*."⁸⁴

As a matter of fact, although the views of the Polish author of the above mentioned answer to Tyutchev preceded Marx, they are no less significant than the texts of Marx. The unknown Polish author says: "You thought that you had satisfied Russia, having

⁸⁴ Tarle, *op. cit.*, p. 238.

PANSLAVISM

893

given her Poland, and the divine justice has already put you at 000
 her feet. Poland resisted and succumbs as a martyr. And what
 is Europe doing? She is pleased to proclaim her own bankruptcy.
 . . . The greatness of Russia is not her own achievement; it is
 the result of the anarchy and inconceivable lack of foresight of
 the other great powers. . . . In 1815 did they not proclaim that
 it was the Muscovite Slavs who liberated Europe from French
 domination? Did they not accord to Russia magnificent aggran-
 dizements? The ambition of Russia does not astonish us at all."
 And, fascinatingly enough, the unknown Polish author of 1851,
 overwhelmed by his distress, asks: "Was it not the *Revue des*
Deux Mondes itself which made the confession that the Russian
 power could be broken only by the American people of the United
 States? And even it doubts it. France, Europe, exist no more."⁸⁵

Comparaison n'est pas raison, one may say; however, the temp-
 tation to quote these texts was too strong.

12. Validity of the Doctrine

It would be difficult to enter into all the historical and political
 details connected with the Panславistic doctrine and its radiation. I
 mentioned above the political reactions against Panславic concep-
 tions among different Slavic nations. The distinguished Russian
 scholar Pypin, whom I have quoted several times, accumulated
 many arguments which even from his own Russian point of view are
 against the Panславistic doctrine. Even more critical were Solov'ev
 and Chicherin. Pypin also stressed the fact that the Russian gov-
 ernment has not always been willing to adopt this doctrine as a
 policy of its program. He mentioned that during different phases
 of her foreign policy Russia had acted against those conceptions
 and against the interests of the Slavic nations which were under
 her special protection, such as Serbia and Bulgaria. Russia, for
 instance, on several occasions guaranteed the integrity of Turkey,

⁸⁵ *La Russie considérée au point de vue Européen*, Librairie Polonaise, Paris, 1851,
 p. 7.

000 which was against the interests of Southern Slavs whom she considered under her protection. Correct are also the following remarks of Sumner: "Although Russia was undisputably the only effective political and military Slav power, her claims to cultural predominance seemed sin and arrogance in the eyes of many Western Slavs. . . . Despite the reforms of the early sixties, Russian tsardom ran counter to the traditions and aspirations of every other Slav people. Emancipation at the hands of the Russian tsar might mean but an exchange of dominations. Gorchakov, always an opponent of Panslav schemes, was justified in writing: '*Je ne vous dissimule pas qu'il m'est difficile de croire à une sympathie sincère des races slaves pour la Russie autocratique.*' However much some of the Czech leaders might blind themselves to the nature of Russian tsardom, the trees of liberty were likely to have very queer blossoms if transported from the ranks of the Neva or the Moskva. Certainly they were not recognizable along the Vistula."⁸⁶

I have just quoted a distinguished modern English historian. Let us see what is said on the same subject by an earlier historian—C. Robert. "It is principally the South Slavic nationalities that the Russian cabinet works to subjugate. For half a century it has surrounded the schismatic Slavs of Turkey and Austria with quite a special protection. Promises, magnificent gifts, nothing is spared in order to seduce them. Sacred ornaments sent by Russia fill their churches; their most beautiful liturgical books are presents of the Holy Synod of Petersburg. The principal personalities of Illyria and Bohemia are, so to say, harassed by homages by the Russian agents. The scholars of Prague receive all kinds of gratifications from the tsar, rings with diamonds, even decorations arrive from the Neva as recompense for services rendered for the cause of Slavic literatures. The Muscovite agents know how to hide under this purely literary propaganda one of the most active political propaganda. In the name of the independence of the whole race they call the subjugated Southern Slavs for a coalition with the tsar against their oppressors. Thus they pretend to find a Pan-

⁸⁶ B. H. Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, Oxford, 1937, p. 269.

PANSLAVISM

895

slavism of a special order, which would consist of grouping the different Slavic nations under the sceptre of the Romanovs as protected powers. This thought appears from the beginning to the end in the long Panslavist epos of the Slovak poet Kollár under the title *Slávy Dcera*. The poet visualizes the peoples as united to form a sort of Colossus modeled on the Babylonian Colossus of the Bible. Russia forms its head, Poland its heart, Bohemia and Illyria are its hands and feet. It would be imprudent to contest what the ideas have of the seductive and the dangerous, one must indeed recognize the existence of a Russian Panslavism, only one may deny its Slavic character and that it ever could possess the sympathy of any independent Slav." 000 186* 829 538

C. Robert stresses another important point when speaking about the activities of the "great protector" among the Danubian and Adriatic Slavs. He would protect them on the condition that they would never follow the example of Serbia and show any pretension for a distinct national existence. "Let one look through the history of these Russian protectorates since the protectorate has been exercised over the last kings of Poland and Georgia to those which the tsar exercises at the present time over the Serbian and Moldavian-Wallachian principalities and over the crumbling Persian empire. One will see that these various protectorates have always had and still have as a unique aim to prevent the protected nations from rising from their humiliation and being reborn to independence."⁸⁷ More than that, the same C. Robert observed that during the upheavals in Cracow and Galicia Russia constantly played the role of an ally of Germany.⁸⁸ 000

On the other hand from time to time, as we may see not only in the brilliant articles of Marx but also in the extremely interesting recent publications of the Soviet scholar Tarle connected with the Crimean War, the tsardom was ready to utilize the Panslavic conceptions when they appeared advantageous for it. It is quite true, for instance, that for Nicholas I it was not easy to combine his 186* 648

⁸⁷ *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1846, pp. 472-473.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 479.

186* imperialistic views on Constantinople with a policy which would necessarily favor revolutionary movements among the Slavs and compromise the gospel of his legitimism. Nevertheless, Marx, Pokrovsky and Tarle gave, as we saw, striking examples of this Machiavellism of Russian policy. Let us, however, analyze the doctrine itself and try to see what were the concrete historical and cultural realities which it had to face. We saw that one of the chief problems, that of Russo-Polish relations, has not been and could not have been solved within the frame of Slavophil or Panslavistic schemes. But what was the general picture?

197 The main argument of unity among the Slavs was of course that of language. The Slavic languages belong to the same family and it is not difficult to prove that certain similar phenomena which appear in different Slavic languages represent not a result of inter-Slavic influences but an independent parallelism of development. For the tenets of the Slavophil doctrine the fact of a common linguistic origin meant very much theoretically. Language is an expression of the relationship between man and the universe, and therefore this expression reveals a—let us say—philosophical outlook. In other words language possesses an

[177] ideological value. On the other hand history differentiated the Slavic peoples. During long centuries they went sometimes not only through different but very often even opposite and contrasting cultural influences; and because of that the languages in their turn also differentiated to such a degree that Slavs are no longer able to understand one another. The amusing point here was the fact that the Slavophiles of the various Slavic nations used German in order to communicate with each other. This was indeed a paradoxical situation for those who were trying to unite themselves first of all against Germanism. Of course Russia was and still is suggesting that the Russian language be accepted as the common language for the Slavs. But this generous offer has not
197 so far been adopted. The linguistic divergencies become even
538 more salient when we leave the field of language proper and try to apply the methods of unification to the field of belles lettres,

PANSLAVISM

897

especially poetry, even if it be the popular poetry. A synthesis ¹⁹⁷ appears absolutely impossible. It would be enough to compare ⁵³⁸ the Czech versification and all the changes it went through with the Russian and Polish to see how great are the differences. Let us take the Russian *byliny* with their assonances, which have no correspondents in other Slavic productions. On the other hand the *Shchedrivky* and the *Koladki* are ritual poems often inspired by historical subjects of a purely Ukrainian character. A quite distinct group is represented by the Serbo-Croatian and Bulgaro-Macedonian popular poetry—heroic rhapsodies which sing of the legendary Serbian hero Kralević Marko, the mother of the Jugović and her sons and many others. This poetry which served the fantasies and mystifications of Mérimée, which enchanted Goethe, Pushkin, Mickiewicz and Nodier, represents a quite special formation and a unique genre in the Slavic world. How different is the medieval Polish poetry, only semi-popular in its most distant origins, with its origin in the Church. Its lyrical starting point is to be found in the *Kyrie Eleison* and *Alleluiah*, refrains of liturgical songs.

Let us abandon for a moment this purely philological state-⁷⁹⁵ ment and turn to a more essential factor which determined the⁵²³ historical development of the Slavic nations: I have in mind re-¹⁹⁷ ligion. Religion divided the whole Slavic world into two parts.⁵³⁸ Bulgarians, Serbians, Great Russians, Ukrainians, and White Ruthenians embraced Eastern Orthodoxy from a Byzantine source. Czechs, Croatians, Slovenes, Slovaks, and Poles embraced the Catholic religion from its Roman Source. And in addition the Czechs went through Hussism; a part of the Ukrainians and White Ruthenians adopted the Union. The Muscovite Slavophiles and Panslavists were fighting against Catholicism. By that very fact they were in opposition to the whole Western Slavic world. Religion determined the cultural differentiation, and if we add to that some other historical factors we shall see that at the time when Russia was under the influence of Byzantium, of the Bulgarian and Serbian messianistic literature which formed her

theory of "Moscow the Third Rome," based on all kinds of im-
 795 ported legends and apocryphas, Poland was shining in the sun of
 563 the Renaissance. She had her Rabelais—Nicholas Rey, her Ron-
 177 sard—Kochanowski, and a wonderfully rich and brilliant poli-
 538 tical literature connected with Latin republican writers, some of
 which was soon translated into foreign languages, even English.

The Southwestern Slavs, the Croatians, Slovenes, and Dalma-
 tians also took part in the achievements of the Renaissance. They
 lived that period in contact with Italy while on the other hand
 Dalmatia was under the influence of several Byzantines. Let me
 recall the brilliant Italianism of Dubrovnik (Ragusa) of the six-
 teenth and seventeenth centuries and the flowering of the Dal-
 matian literature which followed the songs of the provencals
 troubadours, and of the *Dolce stil nuovo*. The Dalmatian muses
 found their inspiration in Petrarch, Boccaccio, Guarini, Tasso,
 Metastasio; this literature knew all genres from *canzone* to the
 pastoral drama and *la commedia dell' arte*. The Czechs went
 through this epoch carrying their religious reform—a heavy bur-
 den but rich in immense moral consequences. It is probably this
 reform that gave the definitive form to the moral and intellectual
 character of this Slavophil and Slavologist nation, least Slavic
 in its spiritual physiognomy.

The marvellous flowering of the Russian and Polish literatures
 in the nineteenth century represents again a kind of exception
 among the Slavic nations. And in spite of a close parallel de-
 velopment, these two literatures very often, following the same
 roads of literary evolution, in many ways contrast with each
 other.²⁰

186* So even if one should try to eliminate the purely political bar-
 563 riers separating the Slavic nations, such as the political antagon-
 isms existing between Bulgars and Serbs, Serbs and Croatians,
 Russians and Poles, Czechs and Slovaks, Ukrainians and Great
 Russians, Ukrainians and Poles, etc., the problem of spiritual

²⁰ I have discussed these problems in a more detailed form in my article, "Existe-
 til un patrimoine commun d'études slaves?" Cf. *Le Monde Slave*, Paris, 1926.

PANSLAVISM

899

unity among the Slavs would still appear very difficult. The cultural differentiation in the march of historical development became so deep that the parental affinities in the Slavic family have been completely lost. And today the cultural type of a Russian differs greatly from the cultural Polish type, and this would be true for all other Slavic examples. 186* 563

How significant, although in part paradoxical in the light of the events of this war, are the following remarks of Vladimir Solov'ev: 181
 "Poland is in Eastern Europe the representative of the spiritual principle which became the basis of Western history. In its spiritual essence the Polish nation, and with it all Catholic Slavs, belong to the Western world. The spirit is stronger than blood; in spite of a blood antipathy toward Germans and blood nearness to Russia, the representatives of Polonism would accept Germanization rather than a union with Russia. A Western European, even a Protestant, is nearer by spirit to a Catholic Pole than an Orthodox Russian. Being the foremost fighters for Western principles, Poles see in Russia the East, hostile to their spiritual essence, an alien and dark force. . . ." "The East," says Solov'ev, "worked out an order of ideas in which man was subordinated to supernatural power. The West created the ideal of the independence of man. In the East the state enslaved the peoples, while Greece elaborated the ideal of the freedom of the peoples. The supernatural element and the predominance of the state have given rise to the idea of resignation. Greece and Rome with their republics developed the principle of spiritual energy and popular activity." (Cf. *ibid.*)

Cultural differentiation represents progress, and the idea of racial unification might be considered as essentially reactionary. And indeed the Panlavistic doctrine is an anti-historical, anti-cultural, and anti-European idea, not only because of its anti-European political implications but because Panlavism refers first of all to theories of racial superiority, supporting them by dubious 000

⁹⁰ V. S. Solov'ev, *Feliki Spov i Khristianskaya Politika*. Cf. *Sobr. Soch.* a, IV, 15.

000 anthropologic speculations. And from this point of view the ideas of Danilevsky, for example, paved the way not only for Stalin's anti-European imperialism but for Hitler's racial conceptions. Besides, Danilevsky's theory of historical-cultural types destroyed the idea of the stability of European culture. From this point of view it was a highly disaggregating, anti-cultural, and belligerent conception of history. The conflict between the Eastern and the Western world was constantly emphasized, and instead of a search for a pacific harmonization of these two worlds, Danilevsky called for a war. This is why he was against the conception of the balance of powers, this is why he was against a Europe in a state of equilibrium and peace. He saw that only a divided Europe, a Europe in a state of conflagration was desirable from the Russian point of view.

Coming back to those conflicting racial and cultural conceptions, we may find many excellent examples which show that a cultural tradition means more than a racial one. If we take the names of some German generals in the last war such as Blaskowitz, Brauchitsch, and Jeschonnek, we may see that their Slavic or even Polish names did not prevent them from making war against Poland. On the other hand, Fabrycy, Januszajtis, Dreszer, Mond, Prugar, Langer, Abraham, and Anders were generals in the Polish army.⁹¹ It would be really impossible to mention all the Poles who played a decisive role in the development of Polish culture and who had names like Copernicus, Chopin, Reymont, Grottger, Andriolli, and so on. What would Polish Slavic philology be without Lelewel, Linde, Kolberg, Baudouin de Courtenay, Kallenbach, Finkel, and Brückner? It would be as difficult to exclude Andrzej Morsztyn, Weyssenhoff, Reymont, and Berent from Polish literature as to exclude Askenazy, Handelsman, Kleiner, Winawer, Wittlin, Tuwim, Slonimski, and so many other Poles of Jewish origin. Is not the Russian picture similar with Pushkin and his Abyssinian ancestry, with Lermontov and

⁹¹ Articles by Jan Wolny "Choroba Słowiańska" in the review *Tygodnik Polski*, New York, nos. 47 and 48, 1946.

PANSLAVISM

901

his Scotch origin, with Dostoevsky and his Polish origin, and 000
Gogol with his Ukrainian descent, not to mention Kantemir, Fon-
vizin, Delvig, Boratynski, Korolenko, Blok, and so many others?
And is it not really stupefying that the ultimate aggressiveness of
an Asiatic Scythian Pan Slavism found its expression in the ter-
rible poem *The Scythians*, written by one of the most European
of Russian poets, the above mentioned Alexander Blok?

Let us return again to the Russian Polish problem, which is 186*
edifying enough. The Russian Slavophiles and Pan Slavists, who, 648
because they were indebted for their inspiration to European
humanitarianism and idealism, seemed to have been destined in
theory at least to sanction Poland's right to independence and
thereby to redeem the political crime committed by Russia, never
proved capable of being true to the dictates of political con-
science. They remained blind even to the dictates of necessity, be-
cause any attempt to achieve the unity of the Slavic world as
long as the Polish question was unsettled was chimerical, just as
indifference to Polish national injuries was dishonesty of thought
and conscience. No wonder, then, that the Russo-Polish *mariage*
forcé was not dissolved by the Slavophiles and Pan Slavists; divorce
by collusion was achieved between those Poles and Russians who
lacked connections with the Slavophil traditions and represented
the spirit of positive Western thought. It is indeed striking to
note the absence among the Russian Westerners of any irrecon-
cilable hostility toward Poland. From the brothers Turgenev, who
are contemporaries of Pushkin down to Granovsky, Stankevich,
Chicherin, and the later liberals, the Westerners, although they
realized the difficulties of solving the antagonism, did not suc-
cumb either to Slavophil fancies or to an elemental Slavophil
hatred for Poland. The Polish problem, as I mentioned above,
was from the very beginning the most important obstacle to the
advancement of Slavophil ideas, for either the system collapsed
or the "unity" of "indivisible Russia" was endangered; conse-
quently the Russian Slavophiles and Pan Slavists were frozen into
immobility by the dangers of both alternatives and were unable

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648 to pursue their proper course. An exit from this dilemma did, however, exist and was discovered by the Westerners. Characteristically enough, the author of the manifesto by which the Provisional Government of Prince Lvov proclaimed Poland's independence, Professor Milyukov, was one of the most brilliant critics of the Slavophil and Panславistic doctrines. His collaborator in this field was a Pole, Alexander Lednicki, who also never had any tendencies toward the Slavophil fancies but from the beginning to the end of his life remained faithful to his European orientation.

But perhaps the most edifying Russian example of the overcoming of nationalism and chauvinism by Christianity and humanitarianism is to be found in the "Polish story" of Tolstoy—in the touching tribute paid to the Polish martyrdom which truly inspired this great Russian writer.²²

13. "Facies hippocratica"

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648 After this rapid course through the thoughts of so many Russian, Polish, Czech, Slovak and other writers and politicians, one unavoidable conclusion is that practically all of them, in spite of their political conflicts, ideological contradictions, and national antagonisms, agreed on one point—the recognition of the moral weakness and lack of moral dignity of Europe. Of course their approaches, motives, points of view, and goals were different. The Russians stated the moral decrepitude of Europe in a more or less speculative way. The Muscovite Slavophiles could, after all, take an attitude of indifference and disinterestedness towards Europe. Russia could separate herself from the West and build a life independent from Europe. The Russian Panславists could try to take advantage of the weakness of Europe for the realization of their Russian imperialistic views. The other Slavs, and especially the Poles, were in a different situation—for them the di-

²² W. Lednicki, *Quelque aspects du nationalisme et du christianisme chez Tolstoj*, Cracow-Paris, 1935.

PANSLAVISM

903

lemma, Europe—Russia, was not a question of speculation—it was a question of life or death. What did Europe give to the Poles? Every day of their life was a day of betrayal by Europe of those ideals which Poles considered Polish ideals because of the very fact they were European. This is the main item of the Polish political texts of that period; and perhaps the most eloquent and at the same time tragic expression of these feelings is to be found in the famous message of the Polish National Government of August 15, 1831 addressed to its Western agents: "Truth, seen whole, has appeared before our eyes. We no longer count on the support of the great powers, who could and who would not, who still can and who will not, save us. We can no longer place any faith in the promises which they have made to us and which they belie by their conduct. . . . England and France, then, would not have employed us for the occasion except as an instrument fit to serve the course of their interests. England would not have lulled us with a few illusions except in order to have one more method of establishing the independence of Belgium. And France would not have made promises to us except to win a majority in the Chambers. Will faith, then be wholly banished from cabinets, and the words of a French and English minister be nothing but worthless farthings? . . . If France and England abandon us today and fail to justify the hopes that they have aroused, our ruin will have been brought about, not by the fury of Russia, or the hostility of Prussia, or the indifference of Austria, but by the self-styled sympathy shown us by France and England. . . . If the cabinets lack the courage to help us, let them at least possess enough dignity to acknowledge their barbaric indifference toward our cause. And if they have ignored the duty imposed on them by prudence, morality, and humanity, the Poles will know how to follow him who prescribes to them the sanctity of their rights and the love of their country. . . ."⁹⁸

For Poland was facing not only the loss of her independence but a complete change of her historical mission. For centuries

⁹⁸ W. Lednicki, *Life and Culture of Poland*, pp. 212-213.

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186* she was considered the *antemurale christianitatis*, the rampart of
 829 Western civilization. An absorption by Russia within the frames
 648 of a Panslavistic conception would mean that Poland would be-
 come an anti-Western rampart. This is what Count Valerian Kra-
 siński stressed already in 1848, foreseeing the present Polish
 catastrophe; Krasiński wrote: "If however the Poles will see that
 they have no chance of receiving from other nations and particu-
 larly from the Germans, the necessary assistance for the recovery
 of their country's independence, and that those nations in granting
 them some advantages, have no other object in view, than to make
 use of them as a bugbear to frighten Russia, in order to prevent
 the consolidation of the internal strength of that country by an in-
 timate union of its Slavonic elements, being themselves ready to
 sacrifice the Poles as soon as their interests may demand it. If such
 a conviction becomes prevalent amongst the Poles, and there can
 be no doubt that it is rapidly spreading, what will then remain to
 them except cordially to unite with the Russians and to become,
 from a barrier between Russia and the rest of Europe, the van-
 guard of the Slavonic race against western Europe and Germany
 in particular."⁸⁴

000 There was perhaps some consolation in the fact that the Poles,
 Russians, and the Slavs in general were not alone in their pessi-
 mistic critique of Europe. The Polish catastrophe, which absorbed
 the Poles and became a test case for all conceptions of Slavic
 union, was not the single factor that shook all European
 life in 1830-31 and in 1863. The French Revolution inaugurated
 a long period of upheavals and perturbations—revolutions, wars
 were following one after the other and the thunder of social tur-
 moils was constantly menacing Europe during the whole 19th
 century. Have I to mention here the piercing voices expressing
 despair and "Weltschmerz," the voices of Chateaubriand, Byron,
 Alfred de Musset, Alfred de Vigny, and so many others as far
 as the "period of transition," to use Krasiński's formula, is con-
 cerned? Have I to recall the pessimism of H. Taine, the indig-

⁸⁴ Valerian Krasiński, *Panslavism and Germanism*, London, 1848, pp. 218-219.

PANSLAVISM

905

nant admonitions of Ruskin, the anxiety of Renan, not to mention the period of the *fin de siècle* and the modern European pessimism of Spengler's jeremiads? 000

This does not change the fact, however, that in the light of the events of the 19th century and especially in the light of the present tragedy of Poland, the Polish "message to Europe" becomes particularly poignant. History has repeated itself almost textually with, however, one exception—that the present betrayal of Poland by the Western democracies has followed an even more cynical and indecent road. And has not the same fate overtaken Yugoslavia?

Of course in all Slavophil and Panslavistic texts one may find political hyperbole, exasperation, dreams, vain hopes, idealistic universalistic conceptions of fraternity of nations, beliefs in international justice, aspirations for national independence, imperialistic pretensions, the ideological play with various historical traditions. But as I stressed above, all that Slavic polyphony starts and ends with a dirge for Europe. Indeed we see all of them—those brilliant prophetic writers like Tyutchev, Dostoevsky, Mickiewicz, Krasiński, and so many others, involved in a great ideological battle, in which clashed their most essential thoughts about humanity and civilization, as if petrified by the same vision of Europe which we find in Herzen's terrible suggestions about "*facies hippocratica*, by which the doctors recognize that death has raised its scythe."

14. Post Scriptum

I mentioned on several occasions the fact that we are witnessing a kind of revival of the Panslavistic conceptions under the Soviet sponsorship. Indeed there was created in Moscow in 1941 a new Panslavic committee under the chairmanship of a general, A. Gundorov, and with representatives of different Slavic nations as its members. This committee started to organize first of all Panslavic meetings in Moscow. Then later Panslavic meet- 186
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EUROPEAN IDEOLOGIES

186* ings, manifestations, and commemorations in America; in June
 668 1942 such meetings and congresses took place in New York, in
 575 Pittsburgh, in Detroit, in Kansas, in Cleveland, in San Francisco,
 in Oakland, and also in Canada, Argentina, etc., organized by
 local Slavic committees. These organizations in America and in
 other countries represent ramifications of the Moscow center; and
 at each meeting they manifested this relationship by sending ad-
 dresses and telegrams not only to the Panslavic committee in
 Moscow but to Stalin, Kalinin, Molotov, and so on. Around the
 Muscovite center were organized during the war all kinds of
 Slavic national committees and unions of patriots at the head of
 which one could find the members of the Panslavic committee in
 Moscow. These committees and unions were nuclei from which
 originated the "democratic governments" imposed by Russia to
 the Slavic and non-Slavic countries (similar committees were or-
 ganized for Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria) which found them-
 selves in the sphere of Russia's influence.

[208] For the task of propaganda of these Panslavic ideas of union
 and fraternity of the Slavs under the protection of Soviet Russia
 and under her cultural leadership there has been established a
 monthly review under the title *The Slavs*, published in Moscow
 in Russian.

186* It is paradoxical enough that if one takes different Soviet encyclo-
 829 pedias one may find a radical refutation of Panslavic con-
 656 ceptions; the Panslavism of the 19th century has been always
 qualified there as a bourgeois imperialistic doctrine. It would
 be very difficult, however, to find any salient difference between
 the Panslavistic imperialistic conceptions of Tsarist Russia, as
 far as their essence is concerned, and the Panslavistic policy of
 the Soviets, even though their motives and ultimate goals are not
 identical. In order to save appearances the official Soviet press
 still stresses that difference; so N. Leonidov in his articles *The
 New Phase in Slav History* published in *New Times* in Moscow
 in September, 1946, said: "The Russian people never identified
 themselves with the imperialistic chauvinistic Panslavism of the

PANSLAVISM

907

186^{*} "monarchists." "The slanderous talk about new Panslavism is part of an anti-Soviet campaign."⁸⁵

829 Of course there are differences. The Russian tsarist government used to change from time to time its attitude toward the doctrines of the Muscovite Slavophiles and those of the Panslavists. All depended on the international situation. Besides, in spite of its Machiavellian policy the tsarist government was still bound by precepts of international and public law as well as by international public opinion, and because of that its Russianizing methods and proceedings were still in a certain degree moderated. Therefore in some cases there appeared a divergence of views between the representatives of the government and the most chauvinistic, aggressive representatives of Russian Panslavism as, for instances, the famous apologist of the Russification of Poland—Katkov. Anyhow the Slavophiles and Panslavists at that time represented a free, independent initiative. From time to time they even found themselves under a governmental observation that was not very benevolent to them, especially when their Panslavic enthusiasm was bringing harm to the Russian government in its relation with neighboring countries.

186^{*} It is obvious that the present situation from this point of view is completely different. Everyone knows that there is no room and no possibility for any individual free political initiative under the rule of the *Politburo*. The whole present Panslavic movement has been organized by the Soviet government, and people who are taking part in it are agents of that government. In the beginning the aim was to organize Slavic elements for the fight against Fascism and Hitlerism, against Germany; the unspeakable German atrocities greatly encouraged these activities. Such is the aspect of the first years of the publication *The Slavs*. We find there articles dealing mostly with war events, with German crimes, or with the military history of Russia, articles glorifying great Russian generals like Kutuzov, Suvorov, great Russian tsars or princes like Alexander Nevsky, Peter the Great, some articles

⁸⁵ Quoted from "Degeneration of Panslavism" by George C. Guina. The article has not yet appeared, but the author has kindly permitted me to use it.

196
666 glorifying the outstanding Soviet generals and, of course, men like Molotov, Lenin, "the great son of Slavdom"; and Stalin, "son of the nations of Russia"—it would be rather difficult to make of him a Slav. There are also articles about different manifestations of old and modern Slavic culture, biographies of great Slavs, predominantly Russian. Copernicus, one of them, had a rather amusing fate under the pen of Soviet clerks writing under the *Politburo's* dictates. The *Small Soviet Encyclopedia* (1926) calls Copernicus the "greatest Polish scholar"; and later, its *Great* brother leaves the reader with the impression that he was a German Scholar. Finally, the review *The Slavs* emphasizes his Polish patriotism and the prestige of the University of Cracow!

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668 The activities concerning the further organization of Panslavic meetings abroad have not been abandoned. On the contrary, recently at the end of 1946 there again took place such meetings in America and in Belgrade with the predominant role played by official and unofficial agents and delegates of Soviet Russia, ending with telegrams and addresses expressing loyalty to Soviet Russia, sent to Stalin, Kalinin, and Molotov. All these facts must lead one to the conclusion that we are witnessing here the organization of a new International, of a Slavic International, parallel to the Comintern, and that the numerous ramifications of this organization outside of Russia represent nuclei of a Slavic fifth column in the countries which are outside of the immediate zone of Soviet influence. Within this zone Russia is much less interested in the development of the Panslavic movement through any special organizations, as she has there at her complete disposal the governments of the countries which are under Russian political domination. I do not have to stress what I mentioned before—that Stalin has in his hands means of Russification about which Goldmann and Katkov could only dream.

Not without interest is the fact that the Inter-Slav Bureau of Foreign Contacts had during the war six sections—for the United States, Canada, Central and South America, Australia and New Zealand, the Near and Middle East, and Great Britain. A seventh

PANSLAVISM

909

section dealt with the "occupied countries" and came partly under the jurisdiction of the Bureau and partly under that of the Committee for Active Struggle Against Fascism. In 1942 the All-Slav Committee's budget amounted to 320,000,000 roubles, in 1943 to 400 million, and in 1944, when the financial division had ceased to come under the control of the Secretariate, the Committee's budget had risen to 550 million roubles. The All-Slav Congress which took place recently in Belgrade has afforded some indications of the place which the All-Slav Committee holds in Russia's post-war political propaganda apparatus. The main speech of the Soviet delegate, General Gundorov, was an invitation to the Slav peoples to ignore "the sinister forces of world reaction" and submit to Communist guidance. Two resolutions¹⁸⁶ passed by the Belgrade Congress deserve attention. The first, which makes Belgrade the center of the All-Slav Committee and Maslavitch its chairman, is an indication of the importance attached in Soviet policy to Slav sentiment in the Balkans, where to some extent it is a substitute for nationalist sentiment. The second resolution provides for the participation in the work of the All-Slav Committee of representatives of "the largest progressive Slav organization from non-Slav countries, with the right to an advisory vote."⁵⁷⁵ ⁶⁶⁸ ⁶⁵⁶

In order not to be misunderstood I feel it necessary to stress that in spite of some striking parallelisms in the use of Panslavic conceptions by Soviet foreign policy and by the Russian tsarist government, the differences remain enormous—but not at all in the sense of Mr. Leonidov's views. As I mentioned before, the Russian tsarist government of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was bound by international and public law; and because of this the fate of the Russian subject of those times cannot be compared to the fate of the modern Russian citizen. Russia was not hidden behind an iron curtain from the world, and foreign travelers could visit Russia and freely observe her life: Poles, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and Russians were sent to Siberia, but tsarist Russia did not know concentration camps; and the conditions of

178

178 the exiles in Siberia during the time of the tsars could not be compared to the atrocious conditions reigning in Soviet concentration camps. Besides, the number of people sent to Siberia by the tsars during a whole century never reached even the smallest portion of the number deported by Stalin in one year. The tsars sent individuals there; Stalin transfers whole nations. Finally, one has to remember that free speech was not completely non-existent in tsarist Russia; the Panslavistic doctrines could be and were discussed—and even criticised. Nothing like that, of course, is possible under the Soviet regime. It happened that during the tsarist period Russia realized her greatest achievements in every field of her life. From Pushkin to Tolstoy, from Glinka to Rimsky-Korsakov, from Levitsky to Repin, from Lomonosov to Mechnikov one has pleiads of Russian men who created the great Russian culture and its prestige. Therefore, at that time Russia might indeed represent a spiritual attraction. People realized that Panslavism did not mean exactly Tolstoy and Rimsky-Korsakov but rather a Russian gendarme. This is why Engels wrote that behind the Panslavic conceptions “stands the terrible reality of the Russian Empire.” But still the power of suggestion and attraction, to say the least, of the great Russian writers was a concrete fact, and even Russian Emperors like Alexander I, Nicholas I, and Alexander II were not deprived of traits which might captivate Europeans.

200 How different is the present situation! Where are the great spiritual achievements of Soviet culture? Even if one admits that there is a Soviet literature, that there is a Soviet science, that there is a Soviet music, what would these achievements mean without the background of the great Russian nineteenth century, and what do they mean in comparison with it? What are the promises and gifts which modern Russia would be able to offer to the Slavs, to mankind? What kind of reality “stands” behind Soviet Panslavism?

When one reads the horrifying, really monstrous reports on the abysmal sufferings and tortures which entire nations are en-

PANSLAVISM

911

during cloistered in that terrifying *castrum doloris* which is the present Russia, when one reads the unspeakable stories of the thousands of concentration camps that have been established in Russia one must indeed be terrified by Soviet Panslavic conceptions; *Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes*. St. Augustine once said that he did not like those who speak about mankind because such people do not like man. Neither Slavophil nor the Panslavist systems have any inspiration for the future.

Such inspiration I have found in a courageous Russian review, *Independent Thought*, appearing in Paris under the editorship of S. P. Melgunov. Not a Slavophil but simply an honest Russian, telling the horrible story of the cruel and fantastic co-operation of the UNRRA with the Soviets in their common fight against hundreds of thousands of displaced persons in Europe who did not want to return to the frightening sphere of Soviet domination, writes as follows:

"The fate of the Poles cannot be indifferent to us. We have no right to forget numerous cases when Polish exiles showed a touching solidarity toward their Russian companions in misfortune. So it was, for instance, last year in Bad-Kempton (South Bavaria), when one ill-omened, terrible morning a detachment of American policemen forced their way into the camp of Russian expatriates in order to make extraditions by force. Looking for the last defense, the Russians gathered in the camp church. When the victims were torn out of the church and put on trucks to be taken to the station, the Polish émigrés ran out of their neighboring camp and lay down on the highways blocking the road of the death transport. Taking advantage of the confusion which arose, numerous Russians succeeded in jumping from the trucks and escaped from the American policemen and the disguised Chekists who accompanied them. Then on the day following this memorable application of justice, over all foreign camps in Bad-Kempton, and among them the Polish camp, funeral flags were raised in memory of eighty-six Russians who did not escape repatriation by force and fell into the hands of the NKVD."⁹⁶

⁹⁶ *Le Pensée Libre—Svobodnaya Mysl*, No. 6, 1946, p. 37.

000 The facts and, let us believe, the accidental excesses, reported in *Independent Thought* show the moral impasse in which the ruling political powers of the world found themselves at the end of the war. However, these facts also show something else: that these unfortunate, displaced people, although divided by the political conflicts that separate their countries, were able to forget their dissensions in the name of human solidarity and common European ideals of freedom and justice.

Who knows, indeed, if the sole source of hope for the future does not lie in the misery of these very people, who fought on all the battlefields of the war for their ideals, vainly looking, at the end of their fight, for some recognition of their human rights.

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 V. A. Frantzev, etc.

7: Lednicki
186

Slavic Peoples E 16

[For data on panslavism and slavophilism see category 116.]